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Local governments have to deal with the benefits and problems arising
from high daily flows of commuters. Commuting has been intensified in
the last decades, both in terms of increased number of commuters and
longer traveled distances, with consequent increase in the time spent in
the journeys, specially during rush hours. According to the United King-
dom Department for Transport annual publication “Transport Statistics
Great Britain" 2013, over 1.1 million persons enter central London daily
during the morning peak, 18% more than in 1996. In 2012, commuters
spent an average of 54 minutes to travel to central London, and 46 min-
utes to to work in the remaining areas of inner London. In the third
quarter of 2014 the average traffic speed in central London between 7
a.m. and 7 p.m. was of 8.4 mph, i.e., 13 km/h (Transport for London
Streets Performance Report, quarter 3 2014/2015).
Intense commuting, namely from one city or jurisdiction to another,
puts pressure in the transportation infrastructures of the cities and gen-
erates congestion problems, such as traffic, pollution or crime, which are
negative externalities. In order to deal with such problems, some local
governments introduced tolls that have to be paid by agents that want
to drive in city centers. Examples include Singapore, London, Stock-
holm and Milan. Those tolls pretend to reduce the levels of congestion
in those areas and fund the construction, maintenance and operation of
transportation infrastructure or transportation services.
Although commuting may originate problems, it also makes agents
contact with more than one city or jurisdiction. This means that com-
muters are exposed to the goods and services provided in both the city
where they live and the one where they work. Public goods provided by
local governments (e.g., transportation infrastructure, free parks, street
lighting, etc.) will, therefore, benefit not just the residents of a city,
but also its workers, independently of their residence. Thus, local public
goods may have a positive spillover effect for the commuters that live in
other cities.
1
Our goal is to analyse the impact of decision decentralizing versus
the decision of a benevolent social planner in a framework that includes
positive or negative externalities. We consider a linear city divided in
two jurisdictions with different productivities (and, thus, different wages)
and let agents decide where they want to work.
The different chapters and their respective contributions are summa-
rized hereafter.
Chapter 1: Commuting-induced spillovers and the
case for efficiency-enhancing local wage taxes
This chapter presents a model of a duo-centric linear city where agents
choose their workplace. Jurisdictions are unequally productive and local
governments use a head tax and, possibly, a source-based wage tax, to
finance a local public good. Each agent derives utility from both the
local public good of the jurisdiction where he works and where he lives;
thus, interjurisdictional commuting generates endogenous spillovers. We
analyze the tax competition equilibrium when local governments only
use the head tax or both the head and the wage tax and compare it to
the utilitarian benchmark. We show that local public goods are always
underprovided in the most productive jurisdiction, but may be overpro-
vided in the least productive one. We also show that distortive source-
based wage taxation may improve upon the equilibrium with residence
taxes alone, as it allows to charge commuters with part of the cost of the
public good they enjoy.
Chapter 2: Endogenous asymmetric transporta-
tion costs and the impact of toll usage
This chapter presents a model of a duo-centric linear city where agents
choose in which jurisdiction they want to work. The transportation cost
in each jurisdiction depends on the investment of each local government
on a local public good. Local governments can use a head tax and,
possibly, a toll, to finance the local public good provision. We analyze the
tax competition equilibrium when local governments only use the head
tax or both the head tax and the toll and compare it to the utilitarian
benchmark. We show that the local public good is always overprovided in
the less productive jurisdiction, but may be under or overprovided in the
more productive one. We also show that the usage of a toll may improve
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the provision of the public good upon the equilibrium with residence
taxes alone, but a simulation shows that it will have a negative impact
on overall utility.
Chapter 3: Optimal fiscal instruments for tax de-
centralization in a city with congestion
This paper presents a model of a duo-centric linear city. Jurisdictions
are unequally productive and agents choose where they want to work,
knowing there is a congestion cost that depends on the number of workers
in each jurisdiction. Local governments can use a head tax, a toll and
a wage tax, to finance the local public good provision. We analyze the
tax competition equilibrium when local governments use (i) only the
head tax, (ii) both the head tax and the toll or (iii) both the head and
wage taxes, and compare it to the utilitarian benchmark. We compare
the three fiscal mechanisms, showing that if the transportation cost is
high enough or the productivity asymmetry is high enough, the head tax
alone is the best choice, while if the transportation cost is low enough:
(i) the wage tax is best for low productivity asymmetries but (ii) the toll
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1.1 Introduction
Agents spend most of their time in the place where they live and where
they work, making them consume the public goods provided in those
places. This means that local public good provision may have a spillover
effect for non residents of a certain region. However, among the several
types of public goods provided by municipalities or jurisdictions we can
find some that are mostly used by the inhabitants of the municipality
(such as garbage collection, gas supply, parks or monuments with free
entrance for locals, etc.) while others are used by both the inhabitants
and the commuters that work there (road construction and maintenance,
free parks, public transportation, street lighting, etc.).
Most types of public goods usually provided by municipalities or
jurisdictions are only consumed by agents if they actually go to that
municipality. Suppose the nearby town (where the agent seldom goes)
now offers, for example, a better garbage collection service. The residents
of that city enjoy higher utility due to cleaner streets, but it is difficult
to argue that someone with seldom contact with that city is now better
off.
The literature usually treats public goods spillovers as exogenous,
i.e., agents “automatically” get utility from the public goods provided in
other jurisdictions.1 However, in a commuting setup spillovers actually
arise in a quite natural and endogenous way, namely by travelling on a
daily basis across jurisdictions the agents enjoy public goods in both the
municipality they live and in the one where they work.
The framework we are considering encompasses a large variety of
possible forms of local governments, from different jurisdictions in one
metropolitan area to neighbooring cities or even states with common
borders as long as it makes sense to have agents commuting from one
to the other. As stated in Peralta (2007) “there is extensive evidence
of the increasing importance of inter-jurisdictional commuting, possibly
fostered by the improvement in transportation technologies”. Such in-
creasing importance is documented for example in Shields and Swenson
(2000), Glaeser et al. (2001) and Renkow (2003) using US data, by Van
Ommeren et al. (1999) for The Netherlands or Cameron and Muellbauer
(1998) for Great Britain. In all this papers we can find clear evidence
that both the number of commuters and the commuting distance has
been increasing in the last 40 or 50 years.
Local governments worldwide have different levels of autonomy, namely
1This is the Oates’s tradition spillover that we can find for example in Besley and
Coate (2003).
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when it comes to tax collection, and access to different kinds of taxes.2
Such taxes include residence-based wealth taxes, pure residence-based
income taxes, pure source-based income taxes, or “hybrid” ones. These
taxes are usually combined with grants or transfers from the central
governments to form the total local budget.
Examples of residence-based wealth taxes are mostly residential and
business property taxes which, in the United States, “are the most im-
portant source of local government tax revenue” (Braid, 2005). Pure
residence-based income taxes charged by local governments can be found
in Baltimore (according to Braid, 2009) or in Portugal.
As stated in Braid (2009) U.S. cities like San Francisco, Los Angeles,
Newark (New Jersey) and Birmingham (Alabama) have pure source-
based wage taxes or payroll taxes that apply uniformly to citizens de-
pending only on their workplace: “a central-city’s wage tax applies at
the same rate to central-city and suburban residents working in the cen-
tral city, but not to central-city and suburban residents working in the
suburbs” (Braid, 2009).
Examples of cities using “hybrid” income taxes are also presented in
Braid (2009). In these cases all central city residents are taxed at a rate,
irrespective of where they work, while residents in the suburbs who work
in the central city can be taxed at a different rate. Kansas City, St. Louis,
Wilmington, Detroit, New York City and Philadelphia are the provided
examples. But the use of wage or income taxes by local governments is
not confined to the U.S. As we can read in Peralta (2007) Mexico and
“several OECD countries have payroll taxes at the state or local level:
Australia, Austria, France and Greece”. Also Korea has source based
income taxes (Chu and Norregaard, 1997). Besides these, Braid (2005)
points the use of such taxes also on Sweden, Denmark, France, Germany,
Japan and Spain.
When we think about the fiscal autonomy of local governments the
problem of centralized vs. decentralized decision immediately arises. We
traveled a long way since the pioneering work of Oates (1972) who for-
malized the standard approach for this question and reached the Oates’s
Decentralization Theorem that states that decentralization is preferred
in the absence of spillover effects while otherwise there is a trade-off due
to the incapability of the central government to follow different public
policies in different regions. This assumption of uniformity of the cen-
tralized policy is used in many other papers on fiscal federalism to impose
a cost on centralization.3 The arguments in favor of local governments
2For a thorough analysis of the fiscal autonomy of local governments please check
the OECD (2009) study.
3For example in Alesina and Spolaore (1997) when studying the size of nations or
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are usually justified by some kind of informational advantage on the fea-
tures of their regions (they are “closer to the people”, which allows to
better respond to the agents’ needs) but the decentralization comes to a
cost due to the failure to internalize tax and expenditure spillover effects
(Oates, 1999).
In this paper we look at the impact of local level fiscal decentralization
on the provision of public goods in a framework where agents commute
and local governments provide public goods (or publicly provided private
goods) with an endogenous spillover effect. Our purpose is to analyze
the majority voting decentralized equilibrium against the benchmark of
a first-best benevolent social planner solution.4 The spillovers we want
to analyze are due to the fact that agents reside in one place but can
work in a different one and therefore can be subject to two different local
governments. The reality we are trying to model is clearly pointed by
Fisher (1996, p.6) when he writes that “Many individuals live in one city,
work in another, and do most of their shopping at stores or a shopping
mall in still another locality”.
Our model introduces public goods with an endogenous spillover ef-
fect in the framework of a linear city used by, e.g., Peralta (2007) and
Braid (2000) to tackle interjurisdictional tax spillovers. The city is di-
vided into two jurisdictions and agents choose where they want to work.
Productivity, and thus wages, differ across regions and individuals trade-
off the advantages (i.e., wage and working conditions) of a given job
against travel costs (distance, time, and money) when choosing their
work place. Our main contribution is to allow individuals to enjoy pub-
lic goods in the work place. We do not, however, model the residence
choice of agents, assuming that residence and working choices are inde-
pendent, as argued by Wildasin (1986) and supported by empirical evi-
dence provided by Rouwendal and Meijer (2001), Glaeser et al. (2001)
and Zax (1991 and 1994). For an analysis of the residence decision re-
fer to Wrede (2009) where land is included and agents can choose their
residence location according to a bid-rent function.5
The contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it in-
troduces public good spillovers in a linear city tax competition model
with commuting in the line of Peralta (2007). On the other hand, it
introduces a distortive wage tax on a model with spillovers.
in Bolton and Roland (1997) analysing the threat of secession.
4The use of such equilibrium in tax competition scenarios can also be found in
Fuest and Hubber (2001) and Grazzini and van Ypersele (2003) who show that cen-
tralized decision regarding capital taxes can make the median voter worse off.
5An approach similar to the one used in Fernandez (2004) based on Wheaton
(1977).
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With this reality in mind, we need a representative agent who derives
utility from both the public good provided in the residence location and
in the working place. This means that agents only get utility from the
public good supplied in the other jurisdiction if they choose to work
there. Otherwise they only get utility from the one provided in their own
jurisdiction. This formulation allow us to have an endogenous spillover
effect instead of the traditional exogenous one.
Naturally agents might enjoy the public goods in other jurisdictions
if they go there for leisure or shopping and therefore use the public goods
provided even without working there. However, such use is occasional
and most of the goods and services from which individual get utility
in those cases are privately provided ones (hotels, restaurants, leisure
facilities, shopping malls, theaters, etc.). As such, we chose to disregard
these situations and concentrate on the commuters for work case.
We prove that in the tax competition equilibrium the public good of
the most productive region is always underprovided, due to the exter-
nality, while that of the least productive region can be under or overpro-
vided. We also show that tax competition leads to a less than efficient
number of commuters in some cases. Interestingly, we show that the in-
troduction of a distortive wage tax improves the provision of the public
goods, when compared to a situation where local governments only use a
lump sum residence tax. The use of the distortive wage tax is therefore,
a second-best result, as it partially offsets the distortion generated by the
endogenous spillover of the public goods.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
Section 3 computes the first best, which is then used as a benchmark to
compare the results obtained in Sections 4 and 5, i.e., the equilibrium
where only a lump sum tax is used, and where both a lump sum and a
distortive tax are used, respectively. Section 6 compares the two equi-
libria found before, and Section 7 concludes.
1.2 The Model
We consider a linear city divided into two jurisdictions with the same size.
Each jurisdiction has an employment center where agents can work. The
total number of residents of the city is normalized to 1, as well as the city
size, with extreme points of the segment -1/2 and 1/2. Inhabitants are
uniformly distributed across the city and cannot choose their residence
location. Each agent is indexed by his residence place, x.
Let n(x) and N(x) denote the density and distribution function, re-
spectively, so that
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n(x) = 1 and N(x) = x+ 12
Since the two jurisdictions have the same size and residents are uni-
formly distributed, both have the same number of inhabitants, N̄ = 1/2.
The median resident of each jurisdiction coincides with the geographic
center of the jurisdiction, i.e., mH = −1/4 and mL = 1/4. The employ-
ment centers are assumed to be symmetrically located in γ and −γ and
located outwards from the median resident (γ > 1/4). This opens up
the possibility for a majority of residents of one jurisdiction to commute
to the other one.
Firms located at the employment centers produce an homogeneous
good according to a linear technology Yi = αiNi, where Yi is the output
and Ni is the number of workers in jurisdiction i.6 The two jurisdictions
have unequal productivities. We use H to denote the high-productivity
jurisdiction and L for the low-productivity one, with αH > αL.
H L
‐1/2 1/20EC H EC L
Figure 1.1: The City
The government of each jurisdiction collects a head tax (Ti) paid by
all its residents and, possibly, an ad-valorem source-based tax on wages
(τi) paid by all workers in the employment center of jurisdiction i to
finance a public good budget Gi.7
The local government budget constraint is therefore
Gi = TiN̄ + αiτiNi
where αi is the gross wage earned by workers in the employment center
of jurisdiction i and Ni is the number of workers in that jurisdiction.
Agents support a per-mile commuting cost c and can choose to which
employment center they want to commute (i.e., where they want to
work). Commuting to the jurisdiction where they do not live is, there-
fore, more costly than commuting to the one where they live since the
6As stated in Peralta (2007) the assumption of a linear technology is not essential
and the obtained results would remain unchanged if we introduce perfectly mobile
capital in the model with a constant returns to scale production function.
7Note that in our setup the head tax Ti can be seen as land or residential property
tax with fixed house size; since residence place is not chosen by agents this is a
lump-sum tax.
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distance they must travel is higher. Each individual provides one unit
of labor and pays a wage tax at the source so that the net wage earned
by an individual working in j is ωj = αj(1 − τj). All agents have a
revenue W from other sources which is assumed to be high enough such
that everyone can always pay his tax bill. Agents get utility both from
private consumption and from the public good provided.
We follow Peralta (2007) and Braid (2000) and assume a quasi-linear
utility function; however, differently from those authors, we allow indi-
viduals to enjoy both the public goods of their residence and work place.
The utility enjoyed by individual x, who lives in i and works in j is given
by:
uij(x; τ ;Gi;Gj) = ωj−Ti+W−c|x−ECj |+(1−k)υ(Gi)+kυ(Gj) (1.1)
i, j = H,L
where ECj is the location of the employment center where the agent
chooses to work (γ or −γ), Gi is the public good provided in the juris-
diction where he lives, Gj is the public good provided in the jurisdiction
where he works and υ(G) is an increasing concave function. We some-
times use the function υ(G) =
√
G to illustrate some of our results. The
intensity of the spillover effect due to having individuals deriving utility
from the public goods provided in both jurisdictions is measured by the
constant k, where 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. When k ≤ 1/2, Gi is more important than
Gj , i.e., agents care more for the public good provided in the jurisdiction
where they live than for the one provided in the jurisdiction where they
work.8
Again, notice that this is not the standard spillover effect we can find
in the literature. In our case agents only get utility from the public good
provided in the other jurisdiction if they decide to work there, i.e., the
spillover is endogenous. When they decide the working location they are
also choosing the public good mix they want to consume.
1.2.1 The choice of the workplace
An agent works in the jurisdiction where he lives if uii(x; τ ;Gi;GH) −
uij(x; τ ;Gi;GL) ≥ 0 and commutes to the other jurisdiction otherwise.
8This is what is considered, for example, in Besley and Coate (2003) and would
fit our model since we argue that agents are able to get utility from a wider variety
of public goods provided in their residence place. However, the assumption of these
boundaries for k is not necessary to reach the results of this paper so we choose not
to impose them and leave the problem as general as possible.
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Looking at this utility difference we can calculate the marginal in-
terjurisdictional commuter, denoted x̂. From (1) we can see that the
difference between the utility obtained working in H and the one ob-
tained by working in L is:
uiH − uiL =

ωH − ωL + 2γc+ k[υ(GH)− υ(GL)] if x ≤ −γ
ωH − ωL + 2xc+ k[υ(GH)− υ(GL)] if −γ < x < γ
ωH − ωL − 2γc+ k[υ(GH)− υ(GL)] if x ≥ γ
If uiH(x; τ) − uiL(x; τ) is positive the agent chooses to work in H,
otherwise he chooses to work in L. Note that for |x| > γ the utility
difference is independent from x which means that if one agents that
lives between the employment center of a jurisdiction and its outer limit
wants to commute to the other one, every agent wants to do the same.
We assume away such non-interesting cases and focus on the situation
where −γ < x̂ < γ. The marginal ij-commuter x̂ is the one indifferent
between working in H or L, therefore
x̂ =
ωH − ωL + k[υ(GH)− υ(GL)]
2c
(1.2)
This marginal interjurisdictional commuter x̂ defines a commuting
equilibrium where all x < x̂ work in H and all x > x̂ work in L.
1.3 First Best
We now compute the utilitarian first best to use as a benchmark for the
tax competition equilibrium analysis, i.e., the decision of a benevolent
social planner that chooses the wage taxes, the residence taxes, the level
of public good provided in each jurisdiction and allocates workers to an
employment center so that overall utility is maximized.
The planner thus faces an overall budget constraint such that the
provision of public goods must be fully paid by the wage and head taxes,
i.e.,








+ N̄ (TH + tL) (1.3)
The problem faced by the social planner is therefore to maximize
the overall utility of the population, which is equal to the sum of the
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utility of all inhabitants of jurisdiction H (UH) and of all inhabitants of
jurisdiction L (UL), subject to the budget constraint (3), by choosing x̂,
GH and GL. It is never optimal to have H-residents commuting to L
since their commuting cost is higher than if they work in H and their
productivity is lower. Therefore, we can only have L residents commuting














Denoting by Ci the total commuting costs of all the residents of



































where the last term in CL is the increase in commuting costs due to the
interjurisdictional commuters which must travel a longer distance.
Total utility in each jurisdiction is therefore given by:
UH = N̄ [ωH − TH +W + υ(GH)]− CH (1.8)





where ∆(υ) = υ(GH)− υ(GL) and k∆(υ) is the impact on utility of the
consumption of the public good provided in jurisdiction H rather the one
provided in L to interjurisdictional commuters.
Note that the two last terms of UL are the gain to L of having inter-
jurisdictional commuters. The novelty of our analysis is reflected on the
term ∆(υ) = υ(GH)−υ(GL) generated by the spillover effect of the pub-
lic goods: agents near the border of jurisdiction L now have two effects
on utility when commuting to H: the difference in wage and the difference
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in the level of public goods provided (weighted by k since they always
get utility (1− k) from GL, the public good provided in the jurisdiction
where they live).
Solving the social planner problem presented previously we can ig-
nore the choice of the wage and head tax. Since the planner can allocate
the workers to any of the employment centers, the fiscal instruments used
to finance the public good is not relevant. The only thing that must be
ensured is that the budget constraint is satisfied with these taxes. We
can then assume τi = 0 and finance the public goods exclusively with
the head (lump-sum) taxes, which ensures the absence of any type of
interjurisdictional transfers.9 Remember that the purpose of the calcu-
lation of the first best is to use it as a benchmark to compare with the tax
competition equilibrium and so we want to keep it as neutral as possible.
The relevant first order conditions are therefore:
∂()
∂x̂





















Equation (10) gives the optimal interjurisdictional commuter x̂o, which
results from the trade-off between commuting costs and productivity
gains and the public good level.10
Equations (11) and (12) express the Samuelson condition for the op-
timal provision of public goods. Since GH provides k-weighted utility
also to x̂ residents of L, the marginal benefit of GH is higher than with-
out the spillover (reflected by the term x̂k) while the inverse applies to
GL.
1.4 The Equilibrium with Residence Taxes
Having calculated the conditions that define the first best, we can now
compute the tax competition equilibrium and compare it to the utili-
9As pointed in Peralta (2007).
10Comparing this condition with the one obtained in Peralta (2007) we can see
that the difference lies exactly on the presence of the term k∆(υ); the spillover makes
agents consider the difference in public goods provision when deciding the work place
since their utility depend on Gj .
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tarian optimum. In this section we assume that a government elected
by majority rule in each jurisdiction decides the taxes and public goods
levels. The elected policy is the one preferred by the median voter of
each jurisdiction which in our model coincide with the median resident,
i.e., mH = −1/4 and mL = 1/4.
In this section we compute the tax competition equilibrium when
local governments only have access to the residence tax, Ti. We can
then use this equilibrium to compare with the one resulting from the
use of a distortive wage tax combined with a lump-sum tax, which is
computed in the next section.
Each local government maximizes the utility of the median voter by
choosing Gi and Ti subject to the commuting equilibrium, x̂, in (2) and
to the budget constraint of the jurisdiction when τ = 0, i.e., Gi = N̄Ti.
For the utility of the median voter we must separate the case where
he commutes to the other jurisdiction from the case where he commutes
to the employment center of his own jurisdiction. We present two cases,
depending on whether the median voter of L works in L or H. While
we cannot ensure in general that H does not commute to region L, we
show in the appendix that this can never happen with υ(G) =
√
G. The
intuition for this resides on the fact that the gross wage earned in L is
lower and the traveled distance by mH is much higher than if he decides
to work in the employment center of H. For the median voter of L it can
make sense to commute to H thanks to the increase in productivity.
The median voter of H thus enjoys an utility of:







For the median voter of L we must separate the case where he works
in L from the case where he commutes to work in H. In the former case,
since the only public good he consumes is GL, we can compute his utility
as:






However, if he decides to work in H he gets utility both from GL
(weighted by 1−k) and GH (weighted by k) and his utility is, therefore,
given by:






+ (1− k)υ(GL) + kυ(GH)
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1.4.1 Median voter of L works in L
Let us first assume that the median voter of L works in the employment
center of L, which happens when x̂ < 1/4. Solving the utility maximiza-
tion problem for mH and mL we have the equilibrium levels of GH and
GL implicitly defined by:
υ′(G∗H) = 2 (1.13)
υ′(G∗L) = 2 (1.14)
These conditions express the usual equality between marginal benefit
and marginal cost. Since the population mass of each jurisdiction is 1/2,
the marginal cost borne by the median voter to provide an additional
unit of public good is 2.
If we compare the tax competition equilibrium obtained with the
first-best we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In the tax competition equilibrium where only the resi-
dence tax is available and both median voters work in their own jurisdic-
tions:
(i) The local public good in jurisdiction H is underprovided and the one
in jurisdiction L is overprovided;
(ii) There is undercommuting of agents.
Proof. See appendix.
The median voter of H does not take into account the spillover effect
of the public good provided in H on the L-residents that commute to
his jurisdiction and, therefore, considers a lower marginal benefit of GH
when compared to the first-best. This leads to a situation of underpro-
vision of this public good. Similarly, the median voter of L does not
consider that a fringe x̂ of the residents of L commute to H and, thus,
get utility from GL weighted by k, leading to overprovision of GL.
Since only the residence tax is being used agents decide their work
place considering the gross wage earned and the public good provided
in each jurisdiction. Knowing that GH is underprovided, jurisdiction H
is less attractive than in the first-best solution, while jurisdiction L is
more attractive due to the overprovision of GL. Therefore, the number
of agents commuting from L to H is lower than in the first best case.
Finally, we check that the equilibrium obtained respects the condition
x̂ < 1/4, i.e., the median voter of L works in L.
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From the first order conditions (13) and (14) we get that the equi-
librium levels of public goods are the same in both jurisdictions:
υ′(G∗H) = υ
′(G∗L) = 2⇔ G∗H = G∗L











⇔ αH − αL <
c
2
Therefore, this is the condition that guarantees that the equilibrium
exists.
1.4.2 Median voter of L works in H
If the median voter of L works in H he earns gross wage αH and gets
utility from public goods provided by both jurisdictions. For the median
voter of H everything remains the same, thus GH is implicitly defined
by (13). The key change for mL is that the utility enjoyed thanks to
the public good provided in his own jurisdiction is weighted by (1− k),
hence GL is implicitly defined by:
(1− k)υ′(G∗L) = 2 (1.15)
The level of public good provided in jurisdiction L is therefore lower
than in the previous case since the marginal benefit of GL to mL is
smaller.
This allows us to establish the following result.
Proposition 2: In the tax competition equilibrium where only the resi-
dence tax is available and both median voters work in the high-productivity
jurisdiction, both local public goods are underprovided.
Proof. See appendix.
As in the previous case, the median voter of H does not take into
account the spillover effect of the public good provided in H on the
L-residents that commute to his jurisdiction, which leads to the under-
provision of GH . Regarding GL, since the median voter of L works in
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H he does not take into consideration that part of the residents in L
get utility υ(GL) from it instead of (1 − k)υ(GL), which results in the
underprovision of this public good.
In this case, we may have both under or overcommuting at the tax
competition equilibrium. This stems from the fact that both jurisdiction
are less attractive than they are in the first best solution due to the
underprovision of both public goods.
We now check that the equilibrium obtained respects the condition
x̂ > 1/4, i.e., the median voter of L commutes to H.
Since we are unable to provide general conditions for this, we choose
to illustrate it with a particular utility function, υ(G) =
√
G, thereby






From the first order conditions (13) and (15) we get the equilibrium


















Thus, the marginal interjurisdictional commuter is
x̂∗ =














For the median voter of L to work in H,
x̂∗ =


















1.5 The Tax Competition Equilibrium with Res-
idence and Wage Taxes
We now focus on the tax competition equilibrium attained when local
governments can use both the residence (lump-sum) and the wage (dis-
tortive) tax.
As a matter of fact, agents are now concerned with the net wage they
earn in each employment center rather than the gross wage dictated by
their productivity. This means that local governments, when deciding
the wage tax level, face a trade-off between financing the public good
and reducing the number of interjurisdictional commuters due to the
reduction of the net wage in the jurisdiction.
As in the previous framework, each local government maximizes the
utility of the median voter by choosing Gi, τi and Ti, subject to the
commuting equilibrium x̂ in (2) and to the budget constraint of the
jurisdiction Gi = N̄Ti + τiαiNi.
Remember that Ni is the number of agents working in the employ-
ment center of jurisdiction i so that NH = 12 + x̂ and NL =
1
2 − x̂.
Again, for the utility of the median voter we must separate the case
where he commutes to the other jurisdiction from the case where he
commutes to the employment center of his own jurisdiction. For the
median voter of H, and as we did in the previous section, we know that
he never commutes to jurisdiction L since the gross wage is lower and
the traveled distance is much higher than if he decides to work in the
employment center of H. For the median voter of L it can make sense
to commute to H thanks to the increase in productivity. Therefore, the
median voter of H enjoys an utility of:







For the median voter of L, his utility when he works in his own
jurisdiction is given by:






If he decides to work in H he gets utility both from GL (weighted by
1− k) and GH (weighted by k) and his utility is, therefore, given by:






+ (1− k)υ(GL) + kυ(GH)
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1.5.1 Median voter of L works in L
Let us first assume that the median voter of L works in the employment
center of L, which happens when x̂ < 1/4. Solving the utility maximiza-
tion problem for mH and mL we have the equilibrium levels of GH and
GL implicitly defined by:
















These conditions express the usual equality between marginal ben-
efit and marginal cost. Note that the marginal cost is affected by the
term τiαi(k/2c)υ′(Gi), which is the impact of the level of public good
on the government budget due to interjurisdictional commuters, whose
choice of working place is driven by public good provision. This means
that increasing the provision of the public good increases the number of
workers subject to the wage tax, affecting the cost borne by the median
voter.
If we now look at the first order conditions that define reaction func-
tions on τH and τL and combine them we obtain the equilibrium levels
of the wage taxes given by:11
τ∗∗H =
αH − αL + k∆∗∗(υ)
3αH
τ∗∗L =
−(αH − αL)− k∆∗∗(υ)
3αL
which yields the equilibrium marginal interjurisdictional commuter:
x̂∗∗ =
αH − αL + k∆∗∗(υ)
6c
With these expression we can show that, in equilibrium, τ∗∗H αH >




L since the opposite relations are ruled-out by the
condition x̂∗∗ > 0.12
The characterization of the tax competition equilibrium is provided
in the following proposition:
11The full first order conditions can be found in the appendix.
12The proof can be found in the appendix.
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Proposition 3: In the tax competition equilibrium where both the resi-
dence and the wage taxes are available and both median voters work in
their own jurisdictions:
(i) The wage is taxed in H and subsidized in L;
(ii) The local public good in jurisdiction H is underprovided while the
one in jurisdiction L is overprovided;
(iii) There is undercommuting of agents.
Proof. See appendix.
The result that region H taxes wages while region L subsidizes them
is also obtained by Peralta(2007): H residents are exporting part of their
tax burden to the interjurisdictional commuters from region L using the
wage tax and since the median voter of L works in L, he uses the head
tax to impose a higher tax burden to the interjurisdictional commuters,
which does not receive the wage subsidy. What we are seeing is a transfer
of income from the interjurisdictional commuters to everyone else.
As for the provision of public goods, agents in H have a marginal
cost of GH lower than those in L. Since both the median voters of H
and L are exporting part of the tax burden to the L interjurisdictional
commuters we have two effects: for H residents, GH is less expensive due
to the tax export and due to the fact that by increasing GH the number
of such commuters increase, which makes it even less expensive; for the
median voter of L increasing GL decreases the number of commuters,
which increases the marginal cost.
Comparing the levels of public good provided in each jurisdiction
with the first-best solution, we reach an intuitive underprovision of the
public good of jurisdiction H and overprovision of the one of jurisdiction
L, as in the previous section.
All these distortions lead to undercommuting. This is easily ex-
plained by the fact that jurisdiction H is less attractive, while jurisdiction
L is more attractive than in the first best case. A lower net wage earned
in the employment center of H (due to the positive wage tax τH) and a
lower level of GH make jurisdiction H not so appealing while the opposite
happens for L (with subsidized wages and higher provision of GL).
1.5.2 Median voter of L works in H
We shall now analyse the Nash equilibrium where the median voter of
L works in the employment center of H, i.e., he ij-commutes. Note that
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the problem for the median voter of H remains unchanged, and GH is
implicitly defined by (16). However, for mL his utility is now given by:






+ (1− k)υ(GL) + kυ(GH)
Recall that the difference to the previous case is that the median
voter of L gets (1 − k)-weighted utility from GL and k-weighted utility
from GH , the public good provided where he works.
The decision on GL is given by:







The marginal benefit of GL for the median voter of L is weighted by
(1 − k) instead of 1, since he works in H and therefore gets k-weighted
utility from GH . The expression for the marginal cost is the same as
before.
Regarding the wage taxes, combining the first order conditions from
the problems of mH and mL we get the following equilibrium expres-
sions:13
τ∗∗H =
αH − αL + c+ k∆∗∗(υ)
3αH
τ∗∗L =
2c− (αH − αL)− k∆∗∗(υ)
3αL
which yields the equilibrium marginal interjurisdictional commuter:
x̂∗∗ =





The next proposition characterizes the tax competition equilibrium:
Proposition 4: In the tax competition equilibrium where both the resi-
dence and the wage taxes are available and both median voters work in
the high-productivity jurisdiction:
(i) The wages are taxed in H and in L;
(ii) The public good in jurisdiction H is underprovided;
13The full first order conditions can be found in the appendix.
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Proof. See appendix.
In this situation no jurisdiction is willing to subsidize wages. The
median voter of L is not willing to subsidize the wage in L due to the
fact that he is not working in that jurisdiction. Since he is now one of the
interjurisdictional commuters he wants to use τL to finance the budget
of L because he is not subject to such tax.
As for the provision of public goods, the intuition is basically the
same as in the previous case, with the additional fact that on the choice
of GL the marginal benefit for mL is now smaller since it is weighted by
(1− k).
We can still show that GH is underprovided, but regarding the public
good of jurisdiction L and the number of commuters we cannot be sure
how the equilibrium levels compare with the first best. We can only say
that if we have overprovision of GL we have undercommuting (jurisdic-
tion L is more attractive than it should) and if we have overcommuting
we have underprovision of GL.14 However, the opposite implications are
not valid.
The intuition for the underprovision of GH is the same as before, but
now for GL all we know is that, comparing to the case where the median
voter of L works in L and we are able to say that it is overprovided, the
marginal benefit is now lower due to the (1 − k) weight. This implies
that the GL level chosen by mL is lower, but we cannot be sure if this
reduction is such that it is not overprovided: it can be above the first
best or it can be bellow the first best. This uncertainty about the un-
der or overprovision of GL extends to the commuting level since it is a
determinant of the desirability of working in L.
1.6 Only Residence Tax vs. Residence and Wage
Taxes
In this section we compare the tax competition equilibrium obtained
when local governments only use the lump-sum head tax to the one
when both the lump-sum head tax and the distortive wage tax are used.
Following the structure of the previous sections, we first focus on the
case where the median voter of L works in L. Comparing the two tax
competition equilibria we achieve a second-best result induced by the use
of the distortive tax:
14The proof can be found in the appendix.
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Proposition 5: When both median voters work in their own jurisdic-
tions, the use of the distortive tax enhances the provision of the public
goods vis-a-vis the case where only the lump-sum tax is used.
Proof. See appendix.











The distortion introduced by the wage tax partially offsets the inef-
ficiency created by the tax competition equilibrium due to the spillover
effect of the public goods to the interjurisdictional commuters. This is a
typical second-best result where the introduction of two distortions (the
wage tax and the inter-jurisdictional externalities) improves upon the
case where only one distortion is present. The tax export generated by
the wage tax on H reduces the marginal cost to the policy-maker in H,
thus leading him to provide a higher level of GH , thus getting closer to
the optimal provision. The reverse applies to L where the overprovision
is reduced by the introduction of the wage subsidy that increases the
cost of provision to mL.
When we look at the case where the median voter of L works in H
the achieved result is not so strong:
Proposition 6: When the median voter of H works in H while the
median voter of L is an interjurisdictional commuter, the use of the dis-
tortive tax increases the level of public goods provided in both jurisdictions
vis-a-vis the case where only the lump-sum tax is used.
Proof. See appendix.









Note that we can no longer say for sure that the provision of both
public goods is enhanced with the introduction of the distortive wage
tax. We can be sure of such enhancement regarding GH , but when we
look at GL we may be facing an increase that changes the situation of
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underprovision to overprovision, since we are not sure of the comparison
between G∗∗L and G
o
L as seen in the previous section.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper introduces commuting-related spillovers in a duo-centric lin-
ear city where local governments provide public goods and agents choose
in which region they want to work.
We show that in the tax competition equilibrium the public goods
provided in the most productive region is always underprovided and the
one provided in the less productive region can be under or overprovided.
Furthermore, we showed that the use of the distortive tax tends to be
preferred to the single use of a lump sum tax in terms of the provision of
the public goods as it partially offsets the distortion introduced by the
endogenous spillover effect.
Since the results were obtained using very general assumptions they
are quite robust since they do not depend on explicit functional forms
for, e.g., υ(Gi). The two kinds of taxes considered are also currently used
in real world countries, such as U.S. states as referred in the introduction
and their application is, therefore, reasonable and feasible.
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1.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.




1 < 0 since 1 + 2x̂








1 > 0 since 1 − 2x̂





















o − x̂∗ > 0⇔ x̂o > x̂∗

Proof of Proposition 2.











, we can state that 1− k < 1− 2x̂ok, i.e.,
υ′(GoL)− υ′(G∗L) < 0. Thus, GoL > G∗L
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, which allow us to state τ∗∗L > 0
(ii) For GH please check the proof of proposition 3 as the problem is
the same.

Proof of Proposition 5.
υ′(G∗H)− υ′(G∗∗H ) = 2−
2
1+2x̂∗∗









Since 1−2x̂∗∗ < 1, we can state that υ′(G∗L)−υ′(G∗∗L ) < 0, i.e., G∗L > G∗∗L

Proof of Proposition 6.
















> 1, thus allowing
to conclude that υ′(G∗H)− υ′(G∗∗H ) > 0, i.e., G∗H < G∗∗H
















∗∗) > 1− k, thus allow-
ing to conclude that υ′(G∗L)− υ′(G∗∗L ) > 0, i.e., G∗L < G∗∗L

The median voter of H is not willing to work in L in section
4.













































The commuting equilibrium is therefore defined by:
x̂ =








and since k ∈ (0; 1)
x̂ ∈
(








Thus, and as expected, it is impossible to have the median voter of H
commuting to L since he would bear a higher commuting cost and earn
a lower wage.
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+ υ′(GH) = 0, which after straightfor-

















= 0, which after









+ υ′(GL) = 0, which after some algebra














= 0, which after some
algebra results in τ∗∗L =
αL−(1−τH)αH+k∆(υ)
2αL












Proof that τ∗∗H αH > τ
∗∗















τ∗∗H αH − τ∗∗L αL =
2
3 (αH − αL + k [υ(G
∗∗
H )− υ(G∗∗L )])






L , thus meaning that, τ
∗∗
H αH > τ
∗∗
L αL and
x̂∗∗ > 0, which is ok.




L ) − υ(G∗∗H ) > αH − αL, thus implying that
x̂∗∗ < 0, which is impossible.

FOC of the utility maximization problems in section 5.2.







For UmL we have:
∂UmL
∂GL





















= 0, which results in τ∗∗L =
c+αL−(1−τH)αH−k∆(υ)
2αL











Proof that, in section 5.2,
(i) Overprovision of GL implies undercommuting of agents;
(ii) Overcommuting of agents implies underprovision of GL.




















Overprovision of GL, i.e., GoL < G
∗∗









< 0. For this to be true, x̂o > x̂∗∗.







0. Therefore, υ′(GoL) < υ
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In the last decades several cities worldwide implemented tolls paid by
drivers who want to drive in the city center during working days be-
tween early morning and late afternoon. Singapore was the first city to
effectively implement a congestion pricing scheme - the Singapore Area
Licensing Scheme - in 1975, based on paper licenses; this scheme was later
replaced by an electronic charging scheme - the Eletronic Road Pricing
(ERP). An impact of the successes and shortcomings of the Singapore
road pricing can be found in Phang and Toh (2004). London introduced
in 2003 a congestion charge which is levied electronically on vehicles trav-
eling on the London Congestion Charge Zone (CCZ), which results have
been analyzed for example by Prud’homme and Bocarejo (2005), Leape
(2006), Givoni (2011) or Dudley (2013). Stockholm implemented in 2007
the Stockholm Congestion Tax which is levied electronically on vehicles
entering and exiting central Stockholm. Milan charges vehicles traveling
on the traffic restricted zone (ZTL) with a scheme which started in 2008
with the name “Ecopass" and then took the name “Area C" in 2012.
Gothemburg implemented in 2013 a toll similar to the one charged in
Stockholm.
Although the main reasons invoked to charge these city tolls are the
reduction of congestion and environmental concerns, the revenue levied
with the tolls is usually directed to the operation, maintenance, and
construction of transportation infrastructure. For example, the London
Congestion Charge is one of the sources of revenue of Transport for Lon-
don, having generated a revenue of £222 million in 2013 (about 5% of
the total revenue, which is mainly composed of public transportation
fares, according to the 2013 Transport for London Annual Report). But
besides the cases where the main argument behind a toll is congestion,
many tolls are charged with the sole purpose of financing the expen-
ditures generated by an infrastructure, e.g., a highway, a bridge or a
tunnel. In Portugal, almost all highways are fully (or at least partially)
tolled. In Lisbon, the two available bridges that can be crossed by trav-
elers arriving from Tagus river south bank are tolled, and the proceeds
are used to fund the maintenance and operation of the bridges.
Daily commuters are the main users of these infrastructures: they
often live in one city and work in another, therefore needing to travel
daily for several miles in order to reach their employment. The commut-
ing distance traveled by workers on a daily basis can be quite long, as
well as the time spent in commuting. Data for Great Britain indicate
that average distance commuted to work in inner London increased from
8.8 km in 2001 to 11.2 km in 2011 (UK Office for National Statistics
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Census 2011), while the average time taken to travel to work in cen-
tral London was, in 2012, of 54 minutes (UK Department for Transport
annual publication “Transport Statistics Great Britain" 2013). These
facts put pressure on local governments to improve the transportation
infrastructure in order to reduce the transportation costs for their vot-
ers (monetary cost and/or time spent in travels), while also meaning
that commuters use the transportation infrastructure of more than one
jurisdiction. Therefore, whenever a local government improves the trans-
portation infrastructure, it is serving all agents using that infrastructure,
thus generating positive spillovers to the residents of nearby cities.
Spillovers are, thus, generated by commuting from one region to an-
other, making agents enjoy public goods in both the municipality where
they live and where they work.1 In this paper we look at the impact of
local level fiscal decentralization on the provision of public goods that
determine transportation cost in a framework where agents commute.
We may consider several types of local governments, from jurisdictions
in one city to neighboring cities or even states, as long as it is expectable
that agents commute from one to the other.
The autonomy of local governments regarding tax collection is far
from being homogeneous. Different local governments have access to
different types of taxes, e.g., residence-based wealth or income taxes,
source-based income taxes, or “hybrid” taxes. 2 These taxes are usually
combined with grants or transfers from the central governments to form
the total local budget.
Tolls to have access to the city center are in practice very close to the
“hybrid" taxes used, for example, in Kansas City, St. Louis, Wilmington,
Detroit, New York City or Philadelphia (Braid, 2009). These “hybrid"
taxes are characterized by the fact that all central city residents are taxed
at a rate, irrespective of where they work, while residents in the suburbs
who work in the central city can be taxed at a different rate. This is
precisely the effect of a toll at the entrance of a city or jurisdiction:
while the residents are not subject to its payment, the residents in the
adjoining cities (or in the suburbs) must pay it, therefore resulting in
different amounts being charged to each type of worker.
The contribution of this paper is the introduction of endogenous and
asymmetric transportation costs in the framework of a linear city allow-
ing, simultaneously, to study the impact of charging a toll on the pro-
1Unlike the case of the exogenous spillover effect considered, e.g., in Besley and
Coate (2003) that follows the traditional Oates’s spillover effect.
2The OECD (2009) study regarding the fiscal autonomy of sub-central govern-
ments provides a thorough analysis of this topic. Braid (2005 and 2009) also provide
several examples of taxes and states or countries that use each kind of tax.
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vision of transportation infrastructure on cities. The linear city model
is the one used by, e.g., Braid (2000) and Peralta (2007) to tackle inter-
jurisdictional tax spillovers. The city is divided into two jurisdictions and
agents choose where they want to work. Productivity, and thus wages,
differ across regions and individuals trade-off the advantages (i.e., wage
and working conditions) of a given job against travel costs (distance,
time, and money) when choosing their workplace. The travel cost differs
from one jurisdiction to the other since it depends on the level of local
public good (which can be understood as transportation infrastructure)
being provided in each jurisdiction. This formulation implicitly intro-
duces a spillover effect on the public good provided on a jurisdiction
that provides employment to the residents of the other one. We take the
residence of agents as given, assuming independence between residence
and working choices. This independence is argued by Wildasin (1986)
and supported by empirical evidence provided by Rouwendal and Meijer
(2001), Glaeser et al. (2001) and Zax (1991 and 1994).
We take a representative agent who derives utility from both the
public good provided in the residence location and in the working place.
This means that agents only benefit from the transportation cost result-
ing from the public good supplied in the other jurisdiction if they choose
to work there. Otherwise they are only interested in the transportation
infrastructure provided in their own jurisdiction. We abstract from other
forms of interjurisdictional commuting, e.g., for leisure or shopping. A
worker uses the transportation infrastructure daily and is therefore much
more important.
Our main results are as follows. Firstly, the toll distorts the number
of interjurisdictional commuters. However, it may improve the provi-
sion of the public good in the high productivity jurisdiction, where the
transportation infrastructure is underprovided if funded only by resi-
dence taxes, as it decreases the marginal cost faced by the median voter
of that jurisdiction. A simulation shows that, even though the provision
of the public in the high productivity jurisdiction may be closer to the
optimal, the overall utility is decreased by the introduction of the toll
due to the reduction of interjurisdictional commuters that it imposes.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model.
Section 3 computes the first best, which is then used as a benchmark to
compare the results obtained in Sections 4 and 5, i.e., the tax competition
equilibrium where only a lump sum residence tax is used, and where both
the residence tax and a toll on interjurisdictional commuters are used,
respectively. Section 6 concludes.
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2.2 The Model
We consider a linear city divided into two jurisdictions with the same size.
Each jurisdiction has an employment center where agents can work. The
total number of residents of the city is normalized to 1, as well as the city
size, with extreme points of the segment -1/2 and 1/2. Inhabitants are
uniformly distributed across the city and cannot choose their residence
location. Each agent is indexed by his residence place, x.
Let n(x) and N(x) denote the density and distribution function, re-
spectively, so that
n(x) = 1 and N(x) = x+ 12
Since the two jurisdictions have the same size and residents are uni-
formly distributed, both have the same number of inhabitants, N̄ = 1/2.
The employment centers are assumed to be symmetrically located in the
center of each jurisdiction, i.e., −1/4 and 1/4. The maximum travel
distance from a point in the jurisdiction and the employment center is,
therefore, 1/4. Since we are analyzing the choice of a local public good
with impact on the transportation costs, the median voter of each juris-
diction is the one that travels the median distance, i.e., mH = −1/8 and
mL = 1/8.3
Firms located at the employment centers produce an homogeneous
good according to a linear technology Yi = αiNi, where Yi is the output
and Ni is the number of workers in jurisdiction i.4 The two jurisdictions
have unequal productivities. We use H to denote the high-productivity
jurisdiction and L for the low-productivity one, with αH > αL.
The government of each jurisdiction collects a head tax (Ti) paid
by all its residents and, possibly, a toll situated at point 0 paid by the
interjurisdictional commuters that are arriving at the jurisdiction, to
finance a public good Gi.5
3As a matter of fact, if we assume that the median voter works in his own juris-
diction, there are two agents that travel the same distance from their residence to the
employment center: for the high productivity jurisdiction, both the one that stands
at −3/8 and the one that stands at 1/8 must travel a distance of 1/8, while for the
low productivity jurisdiction both the agents at 1/8 and 3/8 travel the same distance.
We can therefore use either one or the other, but if we open the possibility of the
median voter to commute to the employment center of the other jurisdiction, only
the one that stand at −1/8 (in H) or 1/8 (in L) fit the median distance of 1/8.
4As stated in Peralta (2007) the assumption of a linear technology is not essential
and the obtained results would remain unchanged if we introduce perfectly mobile
capital in the model with a constant returns to scale production function and a small
region assumption such that f’(k) is given.
5Note that in our setup the head tax Ti can be seen as land or residential property
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Figure 2.1: The City
The local government budget constraint is therefore
Gi = TiN̄ + Pi(max(Ni − N̄ ; 0))
where Pi is the toll collected at the border of jurisdiction i and Ni is
the number of workers in that jurisdiction. Note that the toll is only
paid by the interjurisdictional commuter that are arriving at the region,
i.e., the number of workers that exceed the residents of that jurisdiction
(Ni−N̄); if there is no interjurisdictional commuting towards that region,
the number of workers paying the toll is null.
To travel on each jurisdiction, agents support a per-mile commuting
cost ci which depends on the local public good provision in that juris-
diction, i.e., ci(Gi). Agents can choose to which employment center they
want to commute (i.e., where they want to work). Commuting to the
jurisdiction where they do not live is, therefore, more costly than com-
muting to the one where they live since the travel distance is higher.
Each individual provides one unit of labor and earns a wage ωj = αj
for working in the employment center located in j. All agents have a
revenue W from other sources which is assumed to be high enough such
that everyone can always pay his tax bill.
Agents get utility from private consumption, following a linear utility
function similar to the quasi-linear utility function used by Braid (2000)
and Peralta (2007), but where the utility arising from the public good
is indirectly captured by the reduction in the transportation cost. Since
the transportation cost is not symmetric in the two jurisdictions it is
important to write the utility function in two cases: (i) when the agent
lives and works in the same jurisdiction, and (ii) when the agent is an
interjurisdictional commuter. The utility enjoyed by individual x, who
lives and works in i, is given by:
uii(x;Gi) = ωi − Ti +W − c(Gi)|x− ECi| , i, j = H,L (2.1)
where ECi is the location of the employment center (−1/4 or 1/4)
tax with fixed house size; since residence place is not chosen by agents this is a
lump-sum tax.
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and c(Gi) is the transportation cost per mile, which depends on the
public good provided in the jurisdiction where the agent lives (Gi).
The utility enjoyed by individual x, who lives in i and works in j
(with i 6= j) is given by:
uij(x;Pj ;Gi;Gj) = ωj−Ti+W −c(Gi)|x|−c(Gj)|0−ECj |−Pj , (2.2)
i, j = H,L
where ECj is the location of the employment center where the agent
chooses to work (−1/4 or 1/4), c(Gi) is the transportation cost per mile
in the jurisdiction where the agent lives, which depends on the public
good provided in that jurisdiction (Gi), c(Gj) is the transportation cost
per mile in the jurisdiction where the agent works, which depends on
the public good provided there (Gj), and Pj is the toll charged when the
agent enters jurisdiction j.
The transportation cost per mile in each jurisdiction is given by c(Gi),








2.2.1 The choice of the workplace
An agent works in the jurisdiction where he lives if
uii(x;P ;Gi;GH)− uij(x;P ;Gi;GL) ≥ 0
and will commute to the other jurisdiction otherwise. Given that wage
in H is greater than the wage in L and the travel distance is higher if
the agent decides to commute to the other jurisdiction rather than work
on his own jurisdiction, it is possible to show that the tax competition
equilibrium never involves commuting from H to L. Therefore, we focus
on the choice of the workplace of the agents who live in L.
Computing the utility difference we can calculate the marginal in-
terjurisdictional commuter, denoted x̂. Using (1) and (2), the difference
between the utility obtained working in H and the one obtained by work-
ing in L for a resident on L is:
uiH − uiL =
{
ωH − ωL + 14(cL − cH)− PH − 2xcL if −
1
4 < x <
1
4




Note that for |x| > 1/4 the utility difference is independent from
x, implying that if one agent that lives between the employment cen-
ter of a jurisdiction and its outer limit wants to commute to the other
one, every agent will want to do the same. We assume away such non-
interesting cases and focus on the situation where x̂ < 1/4. The marginal
ij-commuter x̂ will be the one indifferent between working in H or L,
therefore
x̂ =
ωH − ωL + 14(cL − cH)− PH
2cL
(2.3)
This marginal interjurisdictional commuter x̂ defines a commuting
equilibrium where all x < x̂ work in H and all x > x̂ work in L.
2.3 First Best
We now compute the utilitarian first best to use as a benchmark for the
tax competition equilibrium analysis, i.e., the decision of a benevolent
social planner that chooses the residence taxes, the toll, the level of
public good provided in each jurisdiction and allocates workers to an
employment center so that overall utility is maximized.
The planner faces an overall budget constraint such that the provision
of public goods must be fully paid by the head taxes and the toll, i.e.,
GH +GL = N̄ (TH + TL) + Px̂ (2.4)
The problem faced by the social planner is therefore to maximize the
overall utility of the population (U), which is equal to the sum of the
utility of all inhabitants of jurisdiction H (UH) and of all inhabitants
of jurisdiction L (UL), subject to the budget constraint GH + GL =
N̄ (TH + TL) + Px̂, by choosing x̂, GH , GL, TH , TL and P . Recall
that is never optimal to have H-residents commuting to L since their
commuting cost is higher than if they work in H and their productivity
is lower. Therefore, we can only have L residents commuting to H, i.e.,















Denoting by Ci the total commuting costs of all the residents of



























































where the last two terms in CL are the amounts paid by the in-
terjurisdictional commuters in the high productivity jurisdiction (the
transportation cost and the toll to enter H).
If all L residents worked in L the total commuting cost of all the res-
idents of this jurisdiction, CL, would be cL(1/16), which means that the
existence of interjurisdictional commuters, that must travel a longer dis-
tance and pay a toll to get to their employment center, increases the total














Total utility in each jurisdiction is given by:
UH = N̄ [ωH − TH +W ]− CH (2.9)
UL = N̄ [ωL − TL +W ] + x̂ [ωH − ωL]− CL (2.10)
Note that the gain to L of having interjurisdictional commuters is
the difference between the increase in wage earned by this agents and
the increase in the commuting costs referred before.
Solving the social planner problem formalized previously we can eas-
ily see that the planner is indifferent between using the toll or the head
tax, since he can allocate the workers to any of the employment centers.
Therefore the choice of PH , TH and TL is irrelevant for our analysis. The
only thing that must be ensured is that the budget constraint is satisfied
with these taxes. We can then assume PH = 0 and finance the public
goods exclusively with the head (lump-sum) taxes. This has the merit of
ensuring that we are not implicitly performing any type of interjurisdic-
tional transfers.6 Remember that the purpose of the calculation of the
6As pointed in Peralta (2007).
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first best is to use it as a benchmark to compare with the tax competition
equilibrium and so we want to keep it as neutral as possible.
The relevant first order conditions are therefore:
∂()
∂x̂
= 0⇔ x̂o =




























Equation (11) gives the optimal interjurisdictional commuter x̂o, which
results from the trade-off between commuting costs and productivity
gains and the public good level.7
Equations (12) and (13) express the Samuelson condition for the op-
timal provision of public goods. Since GH provides a reduction in the
commuting cost which is beneficial to the interjurisdictional commuters,
the marginal benefit of GH depends positively on x̂ while the inverse
applies to GL.
2.4 The Equilibrium with Transportation Infras-
tructure Funded by Residence Taxes
Having calculated the conditions that define the first best, we can com-
pute the decentralized equilibrium and compare it to the utilitarian op-
timum. In this section we will assume that a government elected by
majority rule in each jurisdiction decides the taxes and public goods lev-
els. The elected policy will then be the one preferred by the median
voter of each jurisdiction.
In this section we compute the equilibrium when transportation in-
frastructure is funded exclusively by a residence tax, Ti. We then use this
equilibrium to compare with the one resulting from the use of a lump-
sum tax combined with a toll, which is computed in the next section.
7Comparing this condition with the one obtained in Peralta (2007) we can see
that the difference lies on the presence of the term (cL − cH)/4 and the use of the
travel cost of L in the denominator; when deciding the workplace, L residents also
consider the difference in the travel costs between L and H, having as benchmark the
commuting cost of their own jurisdiction.
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Each local government maximizes the utility of the median voter,
umi , subject to the commuting equilibrium, x̂, given by (3) when PH = 0
and to the budget constraint of the jurisdiction, i.e., Gi = N̄Ti
As stated previously, the median voter of H stands at −1/8 and the
median voter of L at 1/8 both if he decides to work in L or to be an
interjurisdictional commuter. Therefore, the distance traveled by the
median voter in L is always 1/8, even though the total commuting cost
will differ if he decides to work in H since he must also travel 1/4 miles
in H. We should, then, separate the case where he works in L from the
case where he commutes to work in H.
The median voter of H thus enjoys a utility of:




When the median voter of L works in L, he enjoys a utility of:




If the median voter of L decides to work in H, he enjoys a utility of:







However, since the median voter of L has no power to decide the level
of public good in H, the choice of GL is independent of his choice of the
workplace. It only depends on the distance traveled on L,which is 1/8
in both cases. We can then state the following Lemma:
Lemma 1: Suppose that jurisdictions fund the transportation infrastruc-
ture with a residence tax. Then, the choice, by the median voter of L,
of the level of public good provided in L does not depend on his choice
of the employment center where he works, i.e., the choice of GL is the
same when the median voter of L works in L or in H.
Proof. When the median voter of L works in L, the first order conditions









When the median voter of L works in H, the first order conditions of his
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Therefore, the level of GL chosen by the median voter of L in the tax
equilibrium is the same no matter if he chooses to work in L or in H.
The first order conditions presented in the proof of Lemma 1 implic-
itly define the equilibrium level of GL. Computing also the the solution
of the utility maximization problem for mH (which will provide the equi-
librium level of GH), we find out that both GH and GL are implicitly

























These equations express the usual Samuelson condition of equality
between marginal benefit and marginal cost.8 The marginal benefit is
weighted by the distance traveled by the median voter, 1/8, and since
the population mass of each jurisdiction is 1/2, the marginal cost paid
by each agent to provide an additional unit of public good is 2.
If the first order conditions are equal, the equilibrium level must also
be the same, which leads us to the second result:
Proposition 1: In the equilibrium where the transportation infrastruc-
ture is funded with a residence tax, the levels of public good provided in
H and in L are the same.
Since the median voter has no mechanism to change the cost of provi-
sion of the public good, namely by transferring the cost to the residents
of the other jurisdiction, the only determinant of his choice is the dis-
tance traveled in his jurisdiction. Both the median voter of L and of
H travel 1/8 miles in their jurisdiction, so the equilibrium choice is the
same.
If we compare the equilibrium obtained with the first-best we can
state the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Suppose that jurisdictions fund the transportation in-
frastructure with a residence tax. Then, the level of public good is the
8Samuelson (1954)
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same in both jurisdictions, and it is over provided in the high productiv-
ity jurisdiction, and under provided in the high productivity jurisdiction.
Moreover, there is undercommuting in equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
The median voter of H does not consider the commuters that reside
in L and chose to work in H. These agents also benefit from a lower
transportation cost in H, fact that is disregarded by the median voter
of H, which considers a lower marginal benefit of GH when compared to
the first-best. This situation results in underprovision of GH . Similarly,
the median voter of L does not take into account that x̂ residents of L
commute to H to work and, thus, make a lower use of the transportation
infrastructure of jurisdiction L, therefore resulting in overprovision of
GL.
In this case, when only residence is being taxed, agents decide their
workplace considering the gross wage earned and the transportation costs
in each jurisdiction. Knowing that GH is underprovided, jurisdiction H
is less attractive than in the first-best solution since the transportation
cost is higher than the optimal, while jurisdiction L is more attractive
due to the overprovision of GL, which reduces the transportation cost.
As a result, less agents than optimal are commuting from L to H.
Finally, we check that the equilibrium obtained respects the condition
x̂ < 1/4, i.e., some residents of L commute to the employment center of
L.
From the first order conditions (14) and (15) we get that the equi-
librium levels of public goods are the same in both jurisdictions, so the





To avoid that all population of L commutes to work in the employ-







⇔ ωH − ωL <
cL
2
Therefore, if the equation above is respected, the equilibrium satisfies
the conditions imposed.
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2.5 The Equilibrium with Transportation Infras-
tructure Funded by Residence Taxes and a
Toll
We now analyze the tax competition equilibrium obtained when lo-
cal governments can use both the residence tax (lump-sum) and a toll
charged when agents arrive at the jurisdiction. As a result, when agents
decide to commute to a jurisdiction different from the one they live, be-
sides taking into account the wage that is paid at the employment center
of that jurisdiction and the transportation cost there, must also consider
that there is an additional cost: the toll. This means that local gov-
ernments, when deciding the toll, face a trade-off between financing the
public good and reducing the number of interjurisdictional commuters
due to the increase of the commuting costs of the agents that come from
the other jurisdiction.
The decision process consists of two stages: first, the local govern-
ments choose Gi and then, on the second step, Pi is chosen. Ti ensures
the budget balance. This fact is only relevant for the choice of the me-
dian voter of H since that is the only jurisdiction where the toll will be
charged.
Just as in the previous section, the median voter of H enjoys a utility
of:




Regarding the median voter of L, if he decides to works in L, he also
enjoys the same utility as in the case where only the residence tax was
available:




but if the median voter of L decides to work in H, he must now pay
a toll to enter jurisdiction H, so his utility becomes:






cH − PH (2.19)
Each local government maximizes the utility of the median voter
subject to the commuting equilibrium x̂ and to the budget constraint of
the jurisdiction. For the median voter of L, since there are no agents
commuting from H to L, PL = 0 and he maximizes umL given by (18)
or (19) subject to the commuting equilibrium in (3) and the budget
constraint GL = 12TL, by choosing GL and TL.
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Furthermore, since the median voter of L has no power to decide
neither the level of public good in H, nor the toll being charged there, the
choice of GL is independent of his choice of the workplace, and Lemma
1 applies. The first order conditions are the same as in the equilibrium
with residence taxes, and so is the level of GL.
Regarding the choice in the high productivity jurisdiction, since there
are agents commuting from L to H, the median voter of H has the in-
centive to choose a positive amount for the toll, so that part of the cost
of providing GH is paid by the residents of L. Knowing that the decision
process is in two stages, we use backward induction to find the optimal
choice of GH and PH by the median voter of H.
We begin by characterizing the choice of PH . We maximize umH sub-
ject to the commuting equilibrium x̂ in (3) and to the budget constraint
GH =
1
2TH + x̂PH by choosing PH , yielding the following equilibrium
value of the toll.
P ∗∗H =
ωH − ωL + 14(cL − cH)
2
(2.20)
We now use (20) to solve the first stage of the game, in which juris-
dictions choose GH and GL simultaneously. Jurisdictions maximize the
utility of the median voter given by (17) and (18), subject to the com-
muting equilibrium x̂ in (3), the budget constraint GH = 12TH + x̂PH ,
and the toll obtained in (20).
Solving the utility maximization problem we find the equilibrium











This condition reflects the usual equality between marginal benefit
and marginal cost. The median voter now has a mechanism to charge
part of the cost of providing the public good to the residents of the
other jurisdiction. Therefore, the marginal cost of providing GH which
is perceived by the median voter of H is now reduced by the toll paid
by the interjurisdictional commuters at the entrance of jurisdiction H
(reflected on the derivative ∂(x̂PH)∂GH ).






ωH − ωL + 14(cL − cH) + cL
(2.22)
From this reaction function we can conclude that the local public
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goods of jurisdictions L and H are strategic complements.9 The intu-
ition for this result is as follows: an increase in GL reduces cL, therefore
making jurisdiction L more attractive; since the median voter of H can
now charge a toll to the interjurisdictional commuters, he has an incen-
tive to compete for commuters, which will pay part of the tax burden in
H. He does so by increasing GH .
If we compare the tax competition equilibrium obtained with the
first-best we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 3: In the equilibrium where the transportation infrastruc-
ture is funded with a residence tax and a toll, the high productivity juris-
diction charges a positive toll to the interjurisdictional commuters arriv-
ing from L. The local public good in jurisdiction L is overprovided.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind the fact that region H charges a positive toll to
L residents that work in H is analogous to the one behind the use of a
wage taxes presented in Peralta(2007): H residents are exporting part of
their tax burden to the interjurisdictional commuters from region L. We
can therefore identify a transfer of income from the interjurisdictional
commuters to the residents of the high productivity jurisdiction.
Regarding the provision of public good in jurisdiction L, and as be-
fore, the median voter of L does not take into account that x̂ residents
of L commute to H to work and, thus, use less of the transportation
infrastructure of jurisdiction L, therefore resulting in overprovision of
GL.
As for H residents, the marginal cost of providing GH is now lower
than the one perceived by L residents, since the median voters of H is
exporting part of the tax burden to the interjurisdictional commuters
that are arriving from L; this fact increases the level of public good
provided in H.
When we compare the tax competition equilibrium obtained when
local governments only use the residence tax to the one when both the
residence tax and the toll used, we can reach the following result:
Proposition 4: The use of the toll on the commuters that are arriving
at jurisdiction H increases the level of public good provided in that juris-
diction vis-a-vis the case where only the residence tax is used, but has no






) depends negatively on cL, which means that if cL increases, cH will
also increase since ∂ci
∂Gi
< 0, and vice-versa.
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Proof. See appendix.
The distortion introduced by the toll partially offsets the inefficiency
created by the tax competition equilibrium due to the positive externality
of the public good provided in H to the interjurisdictional commuters.
The tax exporting generated by the toll reduces the marginal cost to the
policy-maker in H, thus leading him to provide a higher level of GH .10
Since the toll has no impact on the budget constraint of L, it has no
impact on the decision being taken by the median voter of that jurisdic-
tion, resulting in no change on the overprovision of GL.
2.5.1 Welfare analysis
In order to analyze the impact of introducing the toll in the utility of
the residents of each jurisdiction and on the overall welfare, we perform
a simulation, assuming ci(Gi) = β− γ ln(Gi), with β high so that ci(Gi)
is always positive.11 We conclude that, for the acceptable parameters of
the model, i.e., such that the marginal interjurisdictional commuter is
not located to the right of the employment center of L, the introduction
of the toll decreases overall welfare in the city vis-a-vis the case where
only residence taxes are used.
To understand the drivers of total welfare, it is useful to separate
two effects: that of productive efficiency, captured by the extent of inter-
jurisdictional commuting, and that of commuting costs. The toll level
discourages commuting because its level is driven by the tax-exporting
motives of the high productivity jurisdiction residents. Therefore, there
is under-commuting, hence, from the viewpoint of productive efficiency,
the introduction of the toll has a negative welfare impact. On the other
hand, the higher public good level in jurisdiction H decreases the com-
muting costs of all H residents, as well as that of the inter-jurisdictional
commuters. However, inter-jurisdictional commuters also bear the neg-
ative impact of the toll, which outweighs the positive one of the lower
commuting cost – were this not the case, there would not be under-
commuting. Therefore, the only positive impact is that on decreased
commuting costs of the H residents, and the overall impact of the toll
is negative. Notwithstanding, it benefits the high productivity region
residents, who can export part of their tax bill to the interjurisdictional
10In the following section we perform simulations assuming ci(Gi) = β − γln(Gi)
where it is possible to observe that, even though the provision of GH increases with
the introduction of the toll, it is still underprovided.
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Figure 2.2: Simulation results for γ = 1
commuters, on top of the lower commuting costs. These results do not
depend on η, as it changes the scale of GH and GL but not the relations
between the variables.12
This simulation points out that, in the absence of other distortions
besides the externality related to the commuting cost presented in this
paper (e.g., congestion), it is better to use a lump sum tax alone, such
as a residence or property tax, than to combine it with a distortive
mechanism such as a toll.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper introduces endogenous asymmetric transportation costs in
a duo-centric linear city where local governments provide public goods
(which determine the transportation cost in each jurisdiction) and agents
choose in which region they want to work.
We show that in the tax competition equilibrium the public good
provided in the low productive region is always overprovided and the one
provided in the high productive region can be under or overprovided, if
a toll is used. Furthermore, we show that the use of a toll tends to be
preferred to the single use of a lump sum tax in terms of the provision of
12We provide in the Appendix simulation results for different levels of η.
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the public goods as it partially offsets the distortion introduced by the
positive externality generated by the public good provided in jurisdiction
H to the residents of L that commute to work in H.
Nevertheless, a simulation shows that, in the absence of other distor-
tions, it is better to use a lump sum tax alone than to combine it with
a distortive mechanism such as a toll.
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2.7 Appendix
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Since GH is underprovided and GL is overprovided ⇒ x̂o > x̂∗

Proof of Proposition 3.
(i) P ∗∗H =
ωH−ωL+ 14 (cL−cH)
2
Since (ωH − ωL) > 0 and (coL − coH) > 0,P ∗∗H > 0
(ii) For GL please check the proof of proposition 3. as the problem is
the same.
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Figure 2.4: Simulation results (2)
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Chapter 3
Optimal fiscal instruments for
tax decentralization in a city
with congestion0
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3.1 Introduction
Congestion is a major issue that large cities must deal with. Average
time taken to travel to work in central London was, in 2012, 54 minutes
and to work in the rest of inner London 46 minutes, according to the
United Kingdom Department for Transport annual publication “Trans-
port Statistics Great Britain" 2013. According to the same publication,
in 2012 over 1.1 million persons entered central London daily during the
morning peak (i.e., from 7 a.m. until 10 a.m.), 18% more than in 1996.
According to Leape (2006), by the 1990s the average speed of trips
across London was below that at the beginning of the twentieth century,
as traffic speeds in central London decreased almost 30 percent from
1975, when the average speed during the morning peak period reached
14.2 mph (23 km/h), until 1998, when the average speed was of 10 mph
(16 km/h). After 1998 this value felt even more: in the third quarter
of 2014 the average traffic speed in central London between 7 a.m. and
7 p.m. was of 8.4 mph (13 km/h), according to Transport for London
Streets Performance Report (quarter 3 2014/2015).
Travel time is only one of several examples of congestion costs asso-
ciated with increased commuting, to which we may add e.g. pollution
and crime, all representing negative externalities for the commuters. As
pointed in Peralta (2007) “there is extensive evidence of the increasing
importance of inter-jurisdictional commuting, possibly fostered by the
improvement in transportation technologies”. This importance is pre-
sented for example in Shields and Swenson (2000), Glaeser et al. (2001)
and Renkow (2003) for the US, by Van Ommeren et al (1999) for the
Netherlands or Cameron and Muellbauer (1998) for the United Kingdom.
All these papers find clear evidence that both the number of commuters
and the commuting distance have been increasing in the last decades.1
This evidence is corroborated by the 2011 England and Wales census,
where it is observable that in these two regions, the average distance
commuted to work increased by 1.6 km since 2001 (Office for National
Statistics UK). Considering inner London workers, the distance increase
is higher, from 8.8 km in 2001 to 11.2 km in 2011, according to the same
census.
In order to deal with increased commuting and resulting congestion
costs, several cities implemented tolls at its entrance.2 In those cities,
1According to Shields and Swenson (2000), 75% of workers in Pennsylvania work in
a municipality different from the one they live. Van Ommeren et al (1999) predict that
60% of male workers in the Netherlands work in a different municipality, commuting
on average 20 km to reach their workplace.
2Local governments want to please in the first place the agents who live in that
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agents must pay a fee if they want to drive in some areas (typically the
city center) and usually during the period that affects the commuters:
working days between early morning and late afternoon. Examples of
cities where tolls are charged are Singapore, London, Stockholm, Milan
or Gothemburg. Singapore was the first city to implement a congestion
pricing scheme, in 1975, which was originally made of paper licenses
and is currently an electronic mechanism (the Electronic Road Pric-
ing). London introduced, in 2003, the London Congestion Charge Zone
which electronically charges vehicles traveling on the city center. From
2007 onwards, the Stockholm Congestion Tax electronically charges ve-
hicles entering and exiting central Stockholm area, a scheme followed by
Gothemburg in 2013. In Milan, vehicles traveling on the traffic restricted
zone are also charged since 2008.3
By introducing tolls, local governments decrease congestion, but may
also be influencing production efficiency by reallocating workers from
a more productive employment center to less productive one. Arnott
(2007) shows that in a framework with one negative externality (traffic
congestion), and one positive externality (external economies of scale),
and where congestion tolling is feasible but wage subsidizing is not, the
imposition of even a low toll might reduce efficiency. Another problem
arising when implementing congestion tolling is to define the optimal
toll level and location. Ekström et al. (2014) analyse the Stockholm
case to conclude that tuning these decisions may lead to a significant
increase in the welfare gain generated by the toll. They also show that
by optimizing both toll locations and levels, a congestion pricing scheme
with welfare gain close to what can be achieved by marginal social cost
pricing can be designed even without tolling all possible tollable links.
The autonomy of local governments is not constant around the world.
For example, when it comes to taxes, Braid (2005) points out that res-
idential and business property taxes, which are residence-based wealth
taxes, are the most important source of local government tax revenue in
the United States. But some local governments also use other types of
taxes, such as pure source-based wage taxes or payroll taxes, which must
jurisdiction, who are their voters, and congestion is one of the issues that must be
dealt by governments. A solution like a tool at the entrance of the city increases
the commuting cost for agents that do not live in the city, therefore reducing the
incentive of non residents to work there, while keeping the commuting cost unaltered
for residents. By these means the local government is able to reduce commuters and,
simultaneously, collect revenue from non residents, which can then be used to please
voters.
3For analysis of the implementation of these tolling schemes check, e.g., Phang and
Toh (2004) for the Singapore case; Prud’homme and Bocarejo (2005), Leape (2006),
Givoni (2011) or Dudley (2013) for London.
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be paid by agents who work in, e.g., San Francisco, Los Angeles, Newark
(New Jersey) or Birmingham (Alabama).4
Besides the examples referred in the U.S., local governments world-
wide use several wage or income taxes: Mexico and several OECD coun-
tries have payroll taxes at the state or local level: Australia, Austria,
France and Greece, as referred in Peralta (2007). Source based income
taxes can be found in Sweden, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan and
Spain (Braid, 2005). 5
The tolls levied to enter some city centers are similar to hybrid taxes
charged in some US cities. As stated in Braid (2009), Kansas City,
St. Louis, Wilmington, Detroit, New York City or Philadelphia charge
“hybrid" taxes where central city residents are subject to a tax rate, no
matter where they work, and agents that live outside the center but
work there are taxed at a different rate. A toll at the border of a city
or jurisdiction has the same practical result: the residents do not pay it,
but the commuters arriving from the suburbs do.
This paper analyses a linear city with commuting and congestion
costs in which the jurisdictions may use tolls to fund local public goods
while, at the same time, discouraging commuting hence decreasing con-
gestion costs. We analyse the majority voting decentralized equilibrium
against the benchmark of a first-best benevolent social planner solution.
The contribution of this paper is the introduction of congestion costs
in the framework of a linear city allowing, simultaneously, to study the
impact of using different fiscal mechanism to deal with congestion on
commuting, productive efficiency and welfare.
The linear city model is used, for example, by Braid (2000) and Per-
alta (2007) to tackle interjurisdictional tax spillovers. The linear city is
divided into two jurisdictions and agents choose where to work. Pro-
ductivity, and thus wages, differ across regions, and agents trade-off the
advantages of a given job (namely, the wage) against travel costs (dis-
tance, time, and money) and congestion when choosing their workplace.
The congestion differs from one jurisdiction to the other since it depends
on the number of employees that decided to work in each jurisdiction.
This set up introduces a negative externality imposed by each worker
on everyone else that decides to work in the same employment center.
We assume that residence and working choices are independent, taking
residence location as exogenous. 6
4As analysed in Braid (2009).
5Check the OECD (2009) study for a thorough analysis of the fiscal autonomy of
local governments.
6This claim finds empirical evidence in Rouwendal and Meijer (2001), Glaeser et
al. (2001) and Zax (1991 and 1994). For an analysis of the residence decision check,
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Our main results are as follows: when local governments only use a
head tax we are in the presence of a pure negative externality, leading to
a situation of overcommuting of agents, but being the best decentralized
alternative if the transportation cost or the productivity asymmetry are
high. The introduction of a toll distorts the number of interjurisdic-
tional commuters, resulting in undercommuting of agents since the local
government of the high productivity jurisdiction uses it both for reduc-
ing congestion and collecting revenue. Nevertheless, the toll is the fiscal
mechanism that presents higher overall utility in a decentralized equilib-
rium if the transportation cost is low and the productivity asymmetry
is mild. Furthermore, we show that it is possible to replicate the first
best by allocating the decision of the toll amount to a benevolent cen-
tral government while leaving the decision regarding the public goods
provision to the local governments. Finally, the introduction of wage
taxes, which can be used by both local governments, may lead to under
or overcommuting, being the best decentralized equilibrium if both the
transportation cost and the productivity asymmetry are low.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 computes the first best, the benchmark that is compared with
the decentralized equilibria obtained in the following sections: Section 4,
i.e., the equilibrium where only a lump sum residence tax is used; Section
5, where local governments use both the residence tax and a toll on
interjurisdictional commuters; and Section 6, where both residence and
source-based wage taxes are used. Section 7 presents a welfare analysis
of the three tax competition equilibria and Section 8 concludes.
3.2 The Model
We consider a linear city divided into two jurisdictions with the same
size. Each jurisdiction has an employment center where agents can work.
The total number of residents of the city is normalized to 1, as well as the
city size, with extreme points of the segment -1/2 and 1/2. Inhabitants
are uniformly distributed across the city and their residence location is
exogenous. Each agent is indexed by his residence place, x.
Let n(x) and N(x) denote the density and distribution function, re-
spectively, so that
n(x) = 1 and N(x) = x+ 12
e.g., Wrede (2009) where agents choose their residence location according to a bid-rent
function. The impact of congestion tolling on the concentration of cities is analyzed
by Arnott (1998). The impact of zoning policies in cities with traffic congestion is
discussed by, e.g., Anas and Pines (2013) and Rhee et al. (2014).
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Since the two jurisdictions have the same size and residents are uni-
formly distributed, both have the same number of inhabitants, N̄ = 1/2.
The median resident of each jurisdiction coincides with the geographic
center of the jurisdiction, i.e., mH = 1/4 and mL = 1/4. The employ-
ment centers are assumed to be symmetrically located in γ and −γ and
located outwards from the median resident (γ > 1/4).
Firms located at the employment centers produce an homogeneous
good according to a linear technology Yi = αiNi, where Yi is the output
and Ni is the number of workers in jurisdiction i.7 The two jurisdictions
have unequal productivities. We use H to denote the high-productivity
jurisdiction and L for the low-productivity one, with αH > αL.
H L
‐1/2 1/20EC H EC L
Figure 3.1: The City
To finance a public good (Gi), the government of each jurisdiction
collects a head tax (Ti) paid by all its residents and, possibly, a toll
(Pi) paid by the interjurisdictional commuters that cross the jurisdic-
tion border, or an ad-valorem source-based tax on wages (τi) paid by
all workers in the employment center of that jurisdiction (wage tax).
The local government decisions are based on majority voting, thus the
selected outcome is the one preferred by the median voter.8
The local government budget constraint is therefore
Gi = TiN̄ + Pi(max(Ni − N̄ ; 0)) + αiτiNi
where αi is the gross wage earned by workers in the employment center of
jurisdiction i, and Ni and N̄ are, respectively, the number of workers and
the number of inhabitants of that jurisdiction. Note that the toll (Pi)
is only paid by the interjurisdictional commuter that cross the border,
i.e., the number of workers that exceed the residents of the jurisdiction
(Ni − N̄). If there is no interjurisdictional commuting towards that
region, the number of workers paying the toll is null.
7As stated in Peralta (2007) the assumption of a linear technology is not essential
and the obtained results would remain unchanged if we introduce perfectly mobile
capital in the model with a constant returns to scale production function and a small
region assumption, ensuring that f’(k) is given.
8Note that in our setup the head tax Ti can be seen as land or residential property
tax with fixed house size; since residence place is not chosen by agents this is a
lump-sum tax.
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To travel on each jurisdiction, the agents support a constant per-
mile commuting cost, c. Agents can choose to which employment center
they want to commute (i.e., where they want to work). Commuting to
the jurisdiction where they do not live is, therefore, more costly than
commuting to the one where they live since the travel distance is higher.
Additionally, if a toll is at place, interjurisdictional commuters must also
pay that additional cost.
Each individual provides one unit of labor and earns a gross wage αj
for working in the employment center located in j. If the wage tax is
being used, agents must pay a tax at the source of the income, so that
the net wage earned by an individual working in j is ωj = αj(1 − τj).
All agents have a revenue W from other sources which is assumed to be
high enough such that everyone can always pay his tax bill.
Agents get utility from private consumption, following a linear utility
function similar to the quasi-linear utility function used by Braid (2000)
and Peralta (2007), but we introduce a congestion cost which positively
depends on the number of agents working at the employment center of
the jurisdiction where the agent is employed (z(Ni)). This congestion
cost may stem from increased traveling time, difficulty in finding parking
space close to the employment center or pollution.
We now write the utility function in two different cases: (i) when the
agent lives and works in the same jurisdiction, and (ii) when the agent
is an interjurisdictional commuter.
The utility enjoyed by individual x, who lives and works in i, is given
by:9
uii(x; τi;Gi) = ωi − Ti +W − c|x− ECi| − z(Ni) + υ(Gi) (3.1)
i, j = H,L
where ECi is the location of the employment center (γ or −γ), Gi is
the public good provided in the jurisdiction where he lives and υ(G) is
an increasing concave function.
The utility enjoyed by individual x, who lives in i and works in j
(with i 6= j) is given by:
uij(x; τj ;Pj ;Gi) = ωj−Ti+W − c|x−ECj |−Pj− z(Nj) +υ(Gi) (3.2)
i, j = H,L
9Recall that x is the point of residence of the agent in the city, i.e., x ∈ [−1/2; 1/2].
If x ∈ [−1/2; 0], the agent lives in the high productivity jurisdiction. If x ∈ (0; 1/2],
he lives in the low productivity one.
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The congestion cost in each jurisdiction is given by z(Ni), which is
an increasing convex function, i.e.,





For simplicity, we assume that z(Ni) = ηN2i /2, where η reflects the
intensity of the congestion cost, i.e., the higher it is, the more costly the
congestion becomes.10 If η = 0 there is no congestion cost and we have
the model analyzed in Peralta (2007).
3.2.1 The choice of the workplace
An agent works in the jurisdiction where he lives if
uii(x; τi;Gi)− uij(x;P ; τj ;Gi) ≥ 0
and commutes to the other jurisdiction otherwise. We can show that
there is only commuting from the low productivity jurisdiction to the
high productivity one and not vice-versa. A resident in H that decides
to commute to L earns a lower wage, faces a higher transportation cost
(since the travel distance is higher) and eventually pays a toll. Each of
these facts reduces the utility of the agent. Even in the case where wage
taxes are used, we may show that the net wage earned in H is always
higher than the net wage in L, thus ensuring there is no incentive for H
residents to work in L.11 If there were agents commuting from H to L,
the congestion in L would also be higher than in H, which would again
reduce the utility of the agent. Therefore, we focus on the choice of the
workplace of the agents who live in L.
Computing the utility difference we obtain the marginal interjuris-
dictional commuter, denoted x̂. Using (1) and (2) it is straightforward
that, for a resident in L, the difference between the utility attained when
working in H rather than in L is:
uiH − uiL =
{
ωH − ωL − PH + 2xc− (z(NH)− z(NL)) if x < γ
ωH − ωL − 2γc+ (z(NH)− z(NL)) if x ≥ γ
When deciding to commute, an individual takes the number of work-
ers in a jurisdiction (NH and NL) as given. Note that for |x| > γ the util-
ity difference is independent from x, implying that if one agent that lives
10Our results do not depend qualitatively on this assumption.
11Computations in appendix.
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between the employment center of a jurisdiction and its outer limit com-
mutes to the other one, every agent does. The marginal interjurisdictional-
commuter x̂ is the one indifferent between working in H or L, therefore
x̂ =
ωH − ωL − PH − (z(NH)− z(NL))
2c
(3.3)
This marginal interjurisdictional commuter x̂ defines a commuting
equilibrium where all x < x̂ work in H and all x > x̂ work in L.
3.3 First Best
We now compute the utilitarian first best to use as a benchmark for the
tax competition equilibrium analysis, i.e., the decision of a benevolent
social planner that chooses the residence taxes, the toll, the wage tax
and the level of public good provided in each jurisdiction and allocates
workers to an employment center so that overall utility is maximized.
The planner faces the following budget constraint:
GH +GL = N̄ (TH + TL) + PH x̂+ τHαHNH + τLαLNL (3.4)
which translates the fact that the provision of public goods must be
fully paid by the head taxes, the toll and the wage tax.
The problem faced by the social planner is therefore to maximize the
overall utility of the population (U), which is equal to the sum of the
utility of all inhabitants of jurisdiction H (UH) and of all inhabitants of
jurisdiction L (UL), subject to the budget constraint (4), by choosing x̂,
GH and GL.
It is never optimal to have H-residents commuting to L since their
commuting cost is higher than if they work in H and their productivity
is lower. Therefore, we can only have L residents commuting to H, i.e.,














Denoting by Ci the commuting costs of all the residents of jurisdiction
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where the two last terms in CL are the increase in commuting costs
due to the interjurisdictional commuters which must travel a longer dis-
tance, and pay a toll to enter H.
Total utility in each jurisdiction is given by:
UH = N̄ [ωH − TH +W − z(NH) + υ(GH)]− CH
UL = N̄ [ωL − TL +W − z(NL) + υ(GL)]+x̂ [ωH − ωL]−x̂ [z(NH)− z(NL)]−CL
Note that the gain to L of having interjurisdictional commuters is the
difference between (i) the increase in the net wage earned by this agents
and (ii) the increase in the congestion cost faced by this individuals,
z(NH) − z(NL), plus (iii) the increase in the commuting costs stated
before.
When solving the social planner problem formalized previously, we
can see that the planner chooses the level of public good provided in
jurisdiction H (GH) and in jurisdiction L (GL), as well as the marginal
interjurisdictional commuter (x̂), i.e., the allocation of workers to the
employment centers.
Therefore, the relevant first order conditions are:12
∂U
∂x̂
= 0⇔ x̂o =


















υ′(GL) = 1 (3.7)
Equations (6) and (7) express the Samuelson condition for the op-
12We checked the second order conditions of this problem, as well as all other
optimization problems present in this paper.
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timal provision of public goods. Equation (5) provides the optimal
marginal interjurisdictional commuter x̂o, which results from the trade-
off between productivity gains, and the increase in commuting and con-
gestion costs.13
The budget constraint (4) must be respected, which means that the
public goods GH and GL must be funded by a combination of head
taxes, wage taxes and a toll. However, the set of fiscal instruments
used by the social planner is not relevant in terms of overall welfare
since the allocation of workers is already decided. Since the purpose of
computing the first best is to use it as a benchmark to compare with
the decentralized equilibrium, we want to keep it as neutral as possible.
For this reason we assume PH = 0, τH = 0 and τL = 0 and finance the
public goods exclusively with the head (lump-sum) taxes. This satisfies
the budget constraint and has the merit of ensuring that we are not
implicitly performing any type of interjurisdictional transfers, as pointed
in Peralta (2007).
Assuming z(Ni) = η
N2i
2 , i = H,L, we get the optimal marginal





The higher is η, the more costly the congestion cost becomes, leading
to a reduction in the optimal number of interjurisdictional commuters.
3.4 The Equilibrium with Residence Taxes
Knowing the conditions that define the utilitarian first best, we can com-
pute the tax competition equilibrium and compare it to this benchmark.
In this section we assume that a government elected by majority rule in
each jurisdiction decides the taxes and public goods levels. The elected
policy is, therefore, the one preferred by the median voter of each juris-
diction.
In this section we compute the tax competition equilibrium when
local governments only have access to the residence tax, Ti. We then
13Comparing this condition with the one obtained in Peralta (2007) we can see
that the difference lies on the presence of the terms concerning the congestion costs.
When deciding the workplace, the residents in L also consider the impact of facing
higher congestion in H; the social planner also takes into account the marginal impact
of increasing the number of workers in H and reducing the number of workers in L in
the congestion cost of each jurisdiction.
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use this equilibrium to compare with the one resulting from the use of
a lump-sum tax combined (i) with a toll or (ii) with a wage tax, which
are computed in the following sections.
Each local government maximizes the utility of the median voter,
umi , subject to the budget constraint of the jurisdiction, i.e., Gi = N̄Ti,
and to the commuting equilibrium, x̂, given by equation (3) when PH =
0, τH = 0 and τL = 0.
The median voter of H thus enjoys a utility of:













Regarding the median voter of L, if he works in L, his utility is:












If the median voter of L decides to work in H, his utility becomes:













The marginal interjurisdictional commuter, x̂, does not depend on the
head tax TL, which is determined such that its revenue pays the public
good, GL. As a consequence, the choice of GL and TL is independent
of the median voter’s choice of the workplace. Furthermore, the only
choice to be taken by the median voter of each jurisdiction is the level
of public good provided in that region. The equilibrium values for GH
and GL are therefore the same as in the first best, implicitly defined by
(6) and (7).
Regarding the number of commuters, in the presence of an externality
the decentralized equilibrium with lump sum taxes cannot be optimal.
When only the residence tax is used, the marginal interjurisdictional
commuter is given by equation (3) with the distortive taxes set to zero,
i.e.,
x̂ =
αH − αL − (zH − zL)
2c
Assuming z(Ni) = η
N2i






For an interior solution x̂∗ < 12 , i.e., c > (αH − αL)−
η
2 .
If we compare the tax competition equilibrium obtained with the
first-best we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 1: In the equilibrium where only the residence tax is used
there is overcommuting of agents.
Proof. See appendix.
Since congestion is a negative externality, there is overcommuting:
residents of L do not take into account their impact on the congestion
cost in H to the other workers of that employment center. As a result,
more agents than optimal are commuting from L to H.
3.5 The Equilibrium with Residence Taxes and
a Toll
We now analyze the tax competition equilibrium obtained when lo-
cal governments can use both the residence tax (lump-sum) and a toll
charged when agents cross the jurisdiction border. As a result, interjuris-
dictional commuters bear an additional cost, the toll, meaning that local
governments face a trade-off between increasing the revenue obtained
with each toll payer and reducing the number of interjurisdictional com-
muters.
Similarly to the previous section, each local government maximizes
the utility of the median voter, umi , subject to the budget constraint of
the jurisdiction, i.e., Gi = N̄Ti+Pix̂, and to the commuting equilibrium,
x̂, given by equation (3) when τH = 0 and τL = 0.
Notice that the utility enjoyed by the median voter of H and by the
median voter of L when he works in his own jurisdiction are the same as
in the previous sections, given by (9) and (10), respectively.
However, if the median voter of L works in H, his utility is:













In the low productivity jurisdiction, since there are no agents com-
muting from H to L, there is no possible revenue from a toll. The median
voter of L maximizes umL given by (10) or (13) subject to the commuting
equilibrium in (3) and the budget constraint GL = 12TL, by choosing GL
and TL.
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When the toll is being used, the marginal interjurisdictional com-
muter is given by equation (3) with the wage taxes equal to zero, i.e.,
x̂∗∗ =
αH − αL − (zH − zL)− PH
2c
(3.14)
Regarding the choice in the high productivity jurisdiction, since there
are agents commuting from L to H, the median voter of H has the in-
centive to choose a positive amount for the toll, so that part of the local
budget is paid by the residents of L. The median voter of H thus maxi-
mizes his utility (9), subject to the commuting equilibrium (14) and to
the budget constraint given by GH = TH(1/2) + PH x̂, by choosing GH ,
TH and PH .









Since some L residents are commuting to work in H, x̂ is positive
and since z is an increasing function, z′ is always positive, allowing us
to state the following Lemma:
Lemma 1: When local governments have the possibility of charging a
toll at the entrance of the jurisdiction, the high productivity jurisdiction
charges a positive toll.
The high productivity jurisdiction charges a positive amount to al-
low L residents to enter in H, thus exporting part of the tax burden
of H to the interjurisdictional commuters, and simultaneously reducing
the congestion in H. The amount of the toll trades-off the revenue per
commuter with the reduction of commuters resulting from the toll, the
latter having a negative impact on the revenue but a positive impact on
the congestion cost.
The marginal interjurisdictional commuter becomes:
x̂∗∗ =




Assuming z(Ni) = η
N2i
2 , i = H,L, we get:
x̂∗∗ =
αH − αL − 14η
4c+ 32η
(3.15)
For feasibility, x̂∗∗ ≥ 0, i.e., αH − αL > η4 .
If we compare the tax competition equilibrium obtained in (15) with
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the first-best we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2: In the equilibrium where both the residence tax, and a
toll at the entrance of H are used, there is undercommuting of agents.
Proof. See appendix.
The introduction of the toll sufficiently increases the commuting cost
that it outweighs the externality effect, moving the equilibrium from
overcommuting to undercommuting. The distortion in the commuting
costs introduced by this fiscal mechanism more than offsets the conges-
tion externality that led to the overcommuting situation in the previous
case. This is due to the fact that the median voter of H is using the
toll with two purposes: reducing the overcongestion in H and, simulta-
neously, getting revenue from the interjurisdictional commuters.
It is possible to replicate the first best by setting the toll such that it
leads to the optimal commuting level defined in (8), and decentralizing
the decision on the provision of the public good, which we already know
that is optimally provided.






combined with decentralized decision about public good and residence taxes
decentralizes the first best.
Proof. See appendix.
In this case it is not possible to decentralize the first best allowing
the jurisdiction to price the externality, as predicted by Coase Theorem,
as the externality is between agents, not between jurisdictions, while the
price of the externality is being decided by the jurisdiction.
3.6 The Equilibrium with Residence Taxes and
Wage Taxes
We now analyze the tax competition equilibrium obtained when local
governments can use both the residence tax (lump-sum) and the wage
tax. As a result of this tax, agents are now concerned with the net wage
ωi = αi(1− τi) earned in each employment center, rather than the gross
wage determined by their productivity. Consequently, the choice of the
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wage tax results from a trade-off between increasing the revenue per
worker and reducing the number of workers in the employment center
(and, therefore, the number of tax payers) due to the reduction of the
net wage in the jurisdiction.
When both the residence and the wage tax are used, the marginal
interjurisdictional commuter is given by (3) with the toll equal to zero,
i.e.,
ˆx∗∗∗ =
ωH − ωL − (zH − zL)
2c
(3.16)
where ωH = αH(1− τH) and ωL = αL(1− τL).
Similarly to the previous sections, each local government maximizes
the utility of the median voter, umi , subject to the commuting equilib-
rium, x̂, given by equation (3) when PH = 0, and to the budget constraint
of the jurisdiction, i.e., Gi = N̄Ti + Niτiαi, where Ni is the number of
workers in the employment center of jurisdiction i, αi is the gross wage
paid in i and τi is the tax rate charged on the wage that is paid in that
jurisdiction.
The median voter of H enjoys a utility of:













Regarding the median voter of L, if he works in L, his utility is:












If the median voter of L decides to work in H, he receives the net
wage paid in that employment center, and must face the congestion of
H. Therefore, he enjoys a utility of:













Unlike the case in sections 4 and 5, the median voter of L has now
an instrument to influence the number of commuters (and, therefore, the
congestion costs faced in each jurisdiction). We must separate the case
in which the median voter of L works in L (and has to pay the wage tax
of L, which is decided by himself) from the case where the median voter
of L works in H.
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Regarding the choice in the high productivity jurisdiction, the median
voter of H maximizes his utility as given by (18), subject to the com-
muting equilibrium (17) and to the budget constraint given by GH =
TH(1/2) + τHαH(1/2 + x̂), by choosing GH , τH and TH .
3.6.1 Median voter of L works in L
Solving for the equilibrium in wage taxes we obtain:14
τ∗∗∗H =













These two equations yield the equilibrium marginal interjurisdic-
tional commuter:
x̂∗∗∗ =




Assuming z(Ni) = η
N2i










−(12c+ 3η)(αH − αL) + 9cη + 3η2
12(3c+ η)αL
(3.22)
For the median voter of L to work in L x̂ < 1/4, i.e., αH−αL < 3c+η2 .
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium:
Proposition 4: In the equilibrium where both the residence and the wage
taxes are available, and both median voters work in their own jurisdic-
tions:
(i) The wage is taxed in H;
(ii) The wage in L is subsidized if the productivity gap between juris-
dictions is high, and taxed if the productivity gap is low.
14The full first order conditions can be found in the appendix.
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(iii) There can be undercommuting, if the commuting cost is high (c >
η/4), or overcommuting of agents, if the commuting cost is low
(c < η/4). If c = η/4 the optimal commuting level is achieved.
Proof. See appendix.
The result that region H taxes wages is also obtained in Peralta
(2007): H residents are exporting part of their tax burden to the inter-
jurisdictional commuters from region L using the wage tax. In this case
the tax on the wage is also a way of reducing the incentive to commute,
which decreases the congestion faced by the residents in H.
Regarding the wage tax in region L we notice that, if the productivity
gap is high enough, i.e., if the number of interjurisdictional commuters
is high, the wage in L is subsidized. The median voter, who works in the
employment center of L, is therefore exporting part of the tax burden
to the interjurisdictional commuters by increasing the residence tax and
distributing part of the amount levied with this tax to the workers in L.
However, if the productivity gap is low, leading to a low number of
interjurisdictional commuters, the median voter of L taxes the wage. In
this case, since there is a higher number of workers in the employment
center of L, the median voter wants to use the wage tax as a way to
make that employment center less attractive and, that way, reduce the
congestion he faces to reach his workplace.
In terms of commuters, we may have either under or overcommuting,
depending on the commuting cost per mile, c, faced by the agents and
the intensity of congestion, η. If the commuting cost per mile is η/4, the
decentralized equilibrium leads to the optimal commuting level. c above
that threshold leads to undercommuting, and below it to overcommuting.
3.6.2 Median voter of L works in H
We now analyse the Nash equilibrium where the median voter of L works
in the employment center of H, i.e., he is an interjurisdictional commuter.
Note that the problem for the median voter of H remains unchanged.
However, for mL the first order conditions of the utility maximization
problem change. As a consequence, the reaction functions on τH and τL
become:15
τ∗∗∗H =












These equations lead to the equilibrium marginal interjurisdictional
commuter:
x̂∗∗∗ =
αH − αL − (zH − zL)− z′H + c
6c
Assuming z(Ni) = η
N2i
2 , i = H,L, we get:
ˆx∗∗∗ =













For the median voter of L to work in H x̂ > 1/4, i.e., αH−αL > c+2η2 .
The next proposition characterizes this tax competition equilibrium:
Proposition 5: In the equilibrium where both the residence and the wage
taxes are available, and both median voters work in the high productivity
jurisdiction:
(i) The wage is taxed in H;
(ii) The wage in L is subsidized if the productivity gap between juris-
dictions is high enough, and taxed if the productivity gap is low
enough;
(iii) There is undercommuting of agents.
Proof. See appendix.
The results are analogous to the ones reached when both median
voters work in their own jurisdictions. The intuition exposed previously
applies with the necessary adaptations: H residents are exporting part
of their tax burden to the interjurisdictional commuters from region L
using the wage tax, which incidently decreases the congestion in H.
Regarding the wage tax in region L we notice that, unlike the case
where there is no congestion cost, the median voter may be willing to
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subsidize the wage paid in the employment center of L even though
he does not work there. That occurs in cases where the number of
interjurisdictional commuters is high, therefore imposing a congestion
problem of such magnitude in H that even the median voter of L is willing
to pay to reduce the number of workers in that employment center.
Regarding the number of commuters, we see that in this case the
decentralized equilibrium always results in undercommuting. Since both
median voters work in the business center of H, both have the incentive
to reduce congestion there, thus leading to number of interjurisdictional
commuters below the optimal.
3.7 Welfare analysis
In this section we compare the equilibria computed previously, in order to
understand what is the best choice of fiscal mechanisms to apply in a lin-
ear city divided in two jurisdictions where agents face congestion costs in
the employment centers. We compare the overall utility achieved in each
case by looking at the module of the difference between the level of com-
muting achieved and the benchmark of the first best. Besides working as
a productivity efficiency indicator, the absolute gap is a valid approach
for overall utility since, using our assumption that zi = ηN2i /2, i = H,L,
overall utility is a quadratic function of the marginal interjurisdictional
commuter.16 We perform pair comparisons of the equilibria computed
in the previous sections to understand which one is preferable in each
case.
Comparing the equilibrium when only the residence taxes are avail-
able with the one when the median voter uses both the residence taxes
and the toll, we find that if the commuting cost is high enough, the use
of the residence tax alone is better, while if the commuting cost is low
enough, it is preferable to combine the residence taxes with a toll.
Recall that the use of the residence taxes alone leads to overcommut-
ing of agents, while the combination of those taxes with a toll leads to
undercommuting. If the commuting cost is low, the number of interjuris-
dictional commuters becomes too high in the case where only residence
taxes are used, therefore imposing a high congestion cost in the high
productivity jurisdiction. In this case, the use of the toll reduces the
number of commuters to a figure closer to the optimum. However, if the
commuting cost is high, the number of interjurisdictional commuters is
low and, if the toll is used, that number of commuters is reduced to a
16For simplicity, we assume η = 1 in this section.
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figure that lies farther away from the first best than the one obtained
with the residence taxes alone.
Comparing the equilibrium when only the residence taxes are avail-
able with the one obtained when the median voter uses both residence
and wage taxes, we find a similar conclusion: if the commuting cost is
high enough, the use of the residence tax alone is better, while if the
commuting cost is low enough it is preferable to combine residence taxes
with wages taxes. Unlike the toll, the wage taxes can lead to under or
overcommuting, but the intuition stated for the case of the toll is valid
in this case as well.
From the two comparisons performed so far we know that for low
commuting costs it is preferable to use a distorting fiscal mechanism (toll
or wage tax) rather than just a lump-sum tax (residence tax). The distor-
tion generated by the toll or by the wage tax partially offsets the negative
externality present in the congestion cost. Notice that, for the commut-
ing equilibria to make sense, the marginal interjurisdictional commuter
x̂ must be inside the city, so between −1/2 and 1/2. As a consequence,
the cases when the commuting cost c is very small are only feasible if the
productivity gap αH − αL is also small. On the other hand, if the wage
gap is very high, the commuting cost must also be high. This means
that, for high levels of productive asymmetry, the commuting cost must
be high and, therefore, the residence tax alone is the best choice.
We shall now compare the two distortive taxes to find which one is
better. This comparison lead us to conclude that, for low levels of pro-
ductivity gap, the wage tax leads to a better output, while for higher
levels of wage gap the toll is preferable. Once again, recall that the toll
always leads to undercommuting while the wage tax can lead to under
or overcommuting, depending on the transportation cost and on the pro-
ductivity gap. If the productivity gap is very small, the effect of the toll
is too strong, reducing the number of commuters to a figure that is father
away from the first best than the wage tax, which is softer. However,
if the productivity gap is mild, i.e., if the number of interjurisdictional
commuters is higher, the toll is more efficient in reducing that number
to a figure closer to the first best than the wage tax.
The following proposition and picture summarize our findings:
Proposition 6: If local governments can choose to use a residence
tax alone, a combination of a residence tax and a toll, or a combination
of a residence tax and a wage tax, the optimal fiscal mechanism to use
is:
(i) The residence tax alone if the transportation cost is high enough or
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if the productivity asymmetry is high enough;
(ii) The residence tax and the wage tax if the transportation cost is low
and the productivity asymmetry is low;
(iii) The residence tax and the toll if the transportation cost is low and













































Figure 1: Optimal fiscal instruments depending on the wage gap
(αH − αL) and on the travel cost (c)
3.8 Conclusion
This paper introduces congestion costs in linear city with two unequally
productive jurisdictions where local governments provide public goods
and agents choose in which region they want to work.
We look at three different fiscal mechanisms currently used in coun-
tries worldwide that can be used by local governments to finance their
budgets: a residence tax alone, a combination of a residence tax and
a toll or a combination of a residence tax and a wage tax. We show
that the residence tax alone always leads to overcommuting of agents
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from the low productivity jurisdiction to the high productivity one, as
the individual agents do not take into account the negative externality
generated by the congestion cost on other individuals. The introduction
of a toll creates a high additional cost to interjurisdictional commuters,
therefore leading to undercommuting. The wage tax can either lead to
over or undercommuting, depending on the productivity asymmetry and
on the transportation cost.
Finally, we compare the three fiscal mechanisms, showing that if the
transportation cost is high enough or the productivity asymmetry is high
enough, the head tax alone is the best choice, while if the transportation
cost is low enough: (i) the wage tax is best for low productivity asym-
metries but (ii) the toll is preferable for mild productivity asymmetries.
We do not analyze the possibility of using all three tax instruments
simultaneously, but the outcome would be similar to the one obtained
when local governments use the residence taxes combined with wage
taxes. As a matter of fact, the wage tax and the toll charged in H
both allow the H residents to export part of their tax bill to the inter-
jurisdictional commuters. For the residents in the low productivity region
that want to commute to H, what matters is the difference between the
net amount received in H and in L. Both the wage tax and the toll are
perceived as a reduction in the net wage that L residents receive when
working in H, so they are indifferent between paying one or the other.
As for H residents, the same reasoning is valid: what matters is the total
revenue levied with these distortive taxes, which impact in the number
of interjurisdictional commuters x̂ is identical.
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3.9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
x̂∗ − x̂o = (αH−αL)2c+η −
(αH−αL)
2c+3η
Since the numerator of both fractions is the same and 2c+ 3η > 2c+ η,
x̂∗ > x̂o

Proof of Proposition 2.
























Where we have used the lower bound of c, αH − αL − 0.5η.

Proof of Proposition 3.
Replacing PH∗o = 2η2c+3η (αH − αL) in the expression of x̂∗∗ we reach
x̂∗∗ = (αH−αL)2c+3η = x̂
o

FOC of the utility maximization problems in section 6.1.
∂UmH
∂τH











where z′H is the partial derivative of the congestion cost, z, with respect
to the number of workers, evaluated at the number of agents working at
the high productivity jurisdiction, i.e., 12 + x̂.


















where z′L is the partial derivative of the congestion cost, z, with respect
to the number of workers, evaluated at the number of agents working at
the low productivity jurisdiction, i.e., 12 − x̂.





















Proof of Proposition 4.































Which can be positive or negative, depending on the wage gap
(αH −αL), on the travel cost c, and on the intensity of the conges-
tion cost η.




(iii) x̂∗∗∗ − x̂o = αH−αL6c+2η −
αH−αL
2c+3η
Since the numerator of both fractions is the same, we can look just
at the denominator:
If c < 14η, x̂
∗∗∗ > x̂o. Otherwise, x̂∗∗∗ < x̂o

FOC of the utility maximization problems in section 6.2.
The FOC on UmH , and consequently the reaction function of τH , is the


















where z′H is the partial derivative of the congestion cost, z, with respect
to the number of workers, evaluated at the number of agents working at
the high productivity jurisdiction, i.e., 12 + x̂.




















Proof of Proposition 5.







































Which can be positive or negative, depending on the wage gap
(αH −αL), on the travel cost c, and on the intensity of the conges-
tion cost η.
For instance, taking η = 1, τ∗∗∗L < 0 if (αH − αL) >
16c2+4c−1
6c+2 and
τ∗∗∗L > 0 otherwise.
Nevertheless, the net wage gap is always positive, irrespective of η.













Focusing on the sign of the numerator,
if (η − 4c) < 0, and knowing that αH − αL > c+2η2 for the median
voter of L to work in H,
(αH−αL)(η−4c)+
(





2 < 0, i.e., x̂
∗∗∗ < x̂o
if (η − 4c) > 0, i.e., c < η4 ,
(αH − αL)(η − 4c) +
(




< (αH − αL)(η − 4c)− 1516η
2 < 0, i.e., x̂∗∗∗ < x̂o

Proof of Proposition 6.
Using the overall utility found in section 3. as U = UH + UL, where
UH is the overall utility of all residents in jurisdiction H and UL is the










x̂2 + (αH − αL)x̂+ d
with d = 12(αH+αL)−GH−GL+W+
1









i.e., U = ax̂2 + bx̂+ d
The difference in overall utility attained in two different levels of com-
muting, x̂1 and x̂2, is therefore:
U(x̂1)− U(x̂2) = a(x̂21 − x̂22) + b(x̂1 − x̂2) = (x̂1 − x̂2)a(x̂1 + x̂2)
Which can be written using the deviation of each commuting level to the
optimal commuting, x̃i = x̂i − x̂o:
U(x̂1)− U(x̂2) = (x̃1 − x̃2)(2ax̂o + a(x̃1 + x̃2) + b)
Which, using x̂o = − b2a becomes
U(x̂1)− U(x̂2) = a(x̃1 − x̃2)(x̃1 + x̃2)





< 0, it immediately follows that when (x̃1−x̃2)(x̃1 +
x̃2) < 0, x̂1 is better, while with (x̃1− x̃2)(x̃1 + x̃2) > 0, x̂2 is better. We
now compute the deviations of each equilibrium to the optimal commut-
ing
x̃∗ = x̂∗ − x̂o = 2(αH − αL)
(2c+ 1)(2c+ 3)
> 0










x̃∗∗∗ = x̂∗∗∗ − x̂o = (αH − αL)(1− 4c)
(6c+ 2)(2c+ 3)
For the cases of the residence tax alone, the residence tax and toll,
and the residence tax and the wage tax, respectively, and using the
results of Propositions 1 and 2.
We now compare welfare levels across the three possible scenarios.
(i) Residence taxes and a toll vs. residence taxes alone
First of all, notice that (x̃∗∗ − x̃∗) < 0 since x̃∗∗ < 0 < x̃∗.
Moreover, straightforward algebra allows us to write (x̃∗∗ + x̃∗) =











< 0, with k1 = 9(αH −
αL) − 2 > 0, k2 = 4[4(αH − αL) + 1][4.5(αH − αL) − 0.75] > 0
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since αH − αL > 14 , k3 = [4(αH − αL) + 1] > 0 using the fact that
αH − αL > 1/4.
Therefore, U(x̂∗∗) > U(x̂∗), i.e., the combination of the residence
taxes and the toll is preferable to the use of the residence taxes
alone, if c is low (c < r1). Otherwise, the use of the residence tax
alone is preferable.
(ii) Residence and wage taxes vs. residence taxes alone
Straightforward algebra allow us to show that
(x̃∗∗∗ − x̃∗) = (αH−αL)(−8c
2−14c−3)
(6c+2)(2c+1)(2c+3) < 0 and
(x̃∗∗∗ + x̃∗) = − (αH−αL)(6c+2)(2c+1)(2c+3) (c− r3) (c− r4),
where r3 = 10+
√
260





Therefore, U( ˆx∗∗∗) > U(x̂∗), i.e., the combination of the residence
and wage taxes is preferable to the use of the residence taxes alone,
if c is low (c < r3). Otherwise, the use of the residence tax alone is
preferable.
(iii) Residence and wage taxes vs. residence taxes and toll
Computations allow us to show that
(x̃∗∗∗ + x̃∗∗) < (αH−αL)(−56c
3−34c2−10c−1.5)










6−8(αH−αL) > 0 if (αH − αL) ∈ (0.75; 1)
Therefore, U( ˆx∗∗∗) > U(x̂∗∗), i.e., the combination of the residence
and wage taxes is preferable to the use of the combination of resi-
dence taxes and toll, if c < r6 and (αH−αL) ∈ (0.75; 1). Otherwise,
it is preferable to use the residence taxes combined with a toll.
(iv) Summarizing:




16 if (αH−αL) < 0.75, or c > r1 if (αH−αL) > 0.75
• The combination of the residence and wage taxes is preferable




(αH − αL) < 0.75
• The combination of the residence taxes and a toll is preferable
when c is low and the wage gap is mild, i.e., c < r1 and
(αH − αL) > 0.75
• The feasibility condition of x̂ not being out of the city limits
must be observed, i.e., if the productivity gap is very high, the
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travel cost must also be high in order to have the marginal
interjurisdictional commuter inside the city. That situation
leads us to the case where c is high and, therefore, the resi-
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